Hashim Yeop Sani FJ:

On 19 June 1982, 42 lawyers were brought before the President of Sessions Court Kuala Lumpur sitting as Magistrate charged for an offence under s. 27(5) of the Police Act 1967. The charge was that on 7 April 1981 they had taken part in an unlawful assembly in a public place for which no licence had been issued under that section of the Police Act. They all claimed trial. Three lawyers had their case deferred. The case against the 39 was eventually heard and finally disposed of on 9 February 1983. What the learned President did on 9 February 1983 was to call upon the appellants to make their defence after the close of the prosecution case. All the appellants elected to remain silent. The learned President then recorded that the charge had been proved. After hearing submissions from all the defence Counsel and the DPP, the learned President admonished and discharged the appellants under s. 173A (ii)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Public Prosecutor appealed against the sentence and the lawyers appealed against the finding that the charge had been proved. Both notices of appeal were filed on the same date on the last day for the notice to be filed.

For convenience, I will deal first with the appeal against the finding of guilt.

The grounds of appeal including the additional grounds allowed before the commencement of the hearing on the appeal may be classified broadly as follows:-

(1) Defects in the charge;

(2) Grounds against specific findings made by the learned President;

(3) The application of Ragunathan v. PP [1982] CLJ 63 (Rep) and PP v. Ismail & Ors. [1976] 1 MLJ 183; and

(4) The proper construction to be given to s. 27 of the Police Act, 1967.

Since the crux of this appeal is really the construction of s. 27 of the Police Act, I propose to deal with this ground first. In connection with this ground the following questions have to be answered:

(1) What was the general law relating to unlawful assemblies when the Police Act was enacted? This will assist in ascertaining the intention of the legislature in enacting s. 27 of the Police Act.

(2) Who may be charged under s. 2(5) of the Police Act and what are the ingredients required to be proved? This will determine the scope of s. 27(5) of the 1967 Act.

The power to interpret implies a discretion in the choice of interpretation. But the Judge is not at liberty to choose any interpretation on his whims and fancies. The interpretation must be such that it meets the legislative purpose of the enactment. See Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs [1980] 1 All ER 529.

The Court as guardian of the rights and liberties enshrined in the constitution is always jealous of any attempt to tamper with rights and liberties. But the right in issue here i.e. the right to assemble peaceably without arms is not absolute for the Constitution allows Parliament to impose by law such restrictions as it deems necessary in the interest of security and public order. In my view, what the Court must ensure is only that any such restrictions may not amount to a total prohibition of the basic right so as to nullify or render meaningless the right guaranteed by the Constitution.

In the construction of statutes the "golden rule" approach says that the only safe course in the interpretation of statute is to read the language of the statute in what seems to be its natural sense. In Vacher & Sons Ltd. v. London Society of Compositors [1913] AC 107 Viscount Haldane LC said:

... I think that the only safe course is to read the language of the statute in what seems to be its natural sense.

What was the general law on unlawful assembly before Parliament enacted the Police Act, 1967? The general law can be found in the Criminal Procedure Code, the Penal Code, the Police Ordinance 1952 and the Public Order (Preservation) Ordinance 1958.

The Police Act 1967 was a consolidated legislation and as the long title suggests, it was "to consolidate and amend the law relating to the organisation, dis