Shaik Daud Ismail JCA:

On 13 January 1996, at about 2.40am appellant was arrested by 1st respondent purportedly under the Emergency (Public Order And Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969, (hereinafter referred to as "the Ordinance"). He was arrested at the Sultanah Aminah Hospital while he was receiving treatment for injuries sustained in a road accident. Eventually by an order dated 12 March 1996, the Deputy Minister for Home Affairs purportedly acting under s. 4(1) of the Ordinance, ordered the appellant to be detained for a period of two years.

By a notice of motion dated 12 February 1996, the appellant applied to the Johor Bahru High Court for a writ of habeas corpus for his release which application was dismissed, hence this appeal.

The main ground of this appeal is that the detention is invalid, in that on the face of it the order is vague as to whether the Deputy Minister had actually applied his mind to the particular circumstances of the case or whether he had exercised his powers of detention mechanically. Section 4(1) of the Ordinance provides that:

If the Minister is satisfied that with a view to preventing any person from acting in any manner ... prejudicial to public order it is necessary that that person should be detained, or that it is necessary for the suppression of violence or the prevention of crimes involving violence that that person should be detained, the Minister shall make an order (hereinafter referred to as a 'detention order') directing that that person be detained for any period not exceeding two years.

On a true reading of s. 4(1) above, it seems clear that there are two distinct limbs namely:

(a) a person who has acted in any manner prejudicial to public order; and

(b) a person, if it is necessary for the suppression of violence or the prevention of crimes involving violence.

It is clear that the legislature intended in s. 4(1) of the Ordinance to confer power on the Minister to issue a detention order based on any of the above two grounds or for that matter, on both the grounds. It also seems clear to us that it was intended by the legislature that there be a clear distinction between the first and the second limbs of s. 4(1) of the Ordinance. Mr. Ranjit Singh counsel for the appellant, submitted that if there appears to be any doubt as to the particular limb the Minister applied his mind to, or whether he applied his mind at all, the detainee must be given the benefit of the doubt. We agree with this submission. Our courts have consistently held that when it comes to interpreting powers of preventive detention, there is no room for giving these powers a liberal interpretation. When it comes to interpreting powers of preventive detention, it must be interpreted strictly.

In PP v. Koh Yoke Koon [1988] 2 MLJ 301 Hashim Yeop A. Sani CJ (as he then was) held that the law of preventive detention must be construed strictly and in the case of doubt the court should lean in favour of the subject. -

In Poh Chin Kay v. Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Anor and Other Appeals [1990] 2 MLJ 297 Hashim Yeop A. Sani CJ (as he then was) - delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court again emphasises at p. 299:

We are conscious of the government's effort to combat the drug menace in this country. But there is a fundamental principle involved here. The power to detain a person without trial cannot be exercised by inference. The power must be expressed, clear and unequivocal. Where detention law and the liberty of the individuals are concerned, this is the most correct approach for the courts to apply.

There is hardly any need to repeat what has been said on the principle to be followed by the courts in dealing with detention law.

In the light of these decisions we now have to look into whether the Deputy Minister had actually applied his mind to the particular circumstances of this case or whether he had exercised his powers mechanically as claimed by the appellant.

It is submitted