Disciplinary authorities must adhere to natural justice principles, providing individuals the right to a fair hearing and access to evidence against them.

[1] We heard arguments on 4 August 2016 and reserved judgment to a date to be fixed. Having deliberated on the matter, we have reached a unanimous decision. This is our judgment.

[2] First the salient facts. On 13 September 2011, the appellant, a Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) with the Royal Malaysian Police and married with six children was issued with a show-cause letter by the disciplinary authority, ie, the 2nd respondent with a view to dismissal or reduction in rank pursuant to reg 37 of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations 1993 ("the Regulations"). He was at the material time the Officer in Charge of the Selama Police District, Perak.

[3] Two charges were preferred against the appellant. The first charge accused him of giving access to his girlfriend of his thumb drive containing classified security information relating to the police force and the second accused him of having illicit intercourse with the same girlfriend between February 2008 and December 2009.

[4] It was also the same girlfriend who lodged the complaint against the appellant that led to the institution of the disciplinary proceedings. The evidence is that she has a history of mental illness, as shown by the medical report at p 392 of the Appeal Record vol 3 (Part C). Page 395 of the same record further shows that on 27 January 2010, she was detained by order of the court for observation at Hospital Permai, Tampoi, Johor Bahru for one month after being charged with an offence under s 489C of the Penal Code. The entire case against the appellant rested on her complaint.

[5] The appellant was given 21 days to submit a written representation, which he did vide a letter dated 8 December 2011 after being granted an extension of time. He categorically denied the two charges. He said they were baseless allegations calculated to bring him down.

[6] By the 2nd respondent's letter dated 30 July 2013, the appellant was informed that the disciplinary authority had found him guilty of both charges and that the punishment was dismissal with effect from 26 July 2013. The dismissal would mean that the appellant will be deprived of his livelihood, which the Federal court in Tan Tek Seng v. Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan & Anor, 1996 MarsdenLR 34 interpreted as to fall within the meaning of deprivation of life under art 5(1) of the Federal Constitution ("the Constitution").