Gopal Sri Ram FCJ:

[1] The appellant was arrested pursuant to the provisions of the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969 ('the Ordinance') on 4 April 2008. An order was made by the Minister under s 4(1) of the Ordinance detaining the appellant for a period of two years. A statement of facts of the same date was served on the appellant in accordance with s 4(4). These two provisions read as follows:

4(1) If the Minister is satisfied that with a view to preventing any person from acting in any manner prejudicial to public order it is necessary that that person should be detained, or that it is necessary for the suppression of violence or the prevention of crimes involving violence that that person should be detained, the Minister shall make an order directing that that person be detained for any period not exceeding two years.

4(4) Whenever any person is detained under any order made under sub-section (1) he shall, in accordance with art 151 of the Constitution, as soon as may be:

(a) be informed of the grounds of this detention;

(b) subject to cl (3) of the said Article (which provides that no authority may be required to disclose facts whose disclosure would in its opinion be against the national interest) be informed of the allegations of fact on which the order is based; and

(c) be given the opportunity of making representations against the order as soon as may be.

[2] The appellant made representations to the Advisory Board ('the board') constituted under art 151(2) of the Constitution. After hearing the appellant's representations, the board dismissed his appeal by making the relevant recommendations to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. The appellant then moved the High Court for an order of habeas corpus. The High Court having declined to grant the order, the appellant has appealed to us.

[3] The Minister's order makes it clear that he directed the detention of the appellant with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to public order. In a gist, the statement of facts on which the Minister based his order recites that the appellant was involved in the smuggling of stolen cars out of Malaysia. The statement condescends to particulars of dates and places where the appellant carried out his activities. The only issue before the High Court and before us is whether the Minister acted lawfully in classifying the activity the appellant is alleged to be involved as constituting an act prejudicial to public order. In order to deal with this issue we must address our minds to the way in which s 4(1) of the Ordinance is constructed.

It will be noted that s 6 used the formula 'If the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is satisfied etc.' In the past such a subjective formula would have barred the courts from going behind His Majesty's reasons for his decision to reject the plaintiff 's application; but, as stated by the learned judge, administrative law has since so far advanced such that today such a subjective formula no longer excludes judicial review if objective facts have to be ascertained before arriving at such satisfaction and the test of unreasonableness is not whether a particular person considers a particular course unreasonable, but whether it could be said that no reasonable person could consider that course reasonable - see the cases cited by the learned judge at p 360.

In the same case, Abdoolcader J at first instance had this to say:

It has been suggested in the past that the qualification of the statement of a power by introductory words