Raja Azlan Shah J (delivering oral judgement):

The appellant was charged with obstructing the chief assistant district officer, Kuala Lumpur, in the discharge of his public function, an offence punishable under s. 186 of the Penal Code. He was unrepresented in the Court below. He claimed trial and was duly convicted and sentenced to three months' imprisonment.

The facts are sufficiently stated in the learned Magistrate's judgment. The appellant had for the last 3'bd years been frequenting the district office in order to apply for a piece of land on Mountbatten Road. It is not disputed that he pestered the district officer with his claim about four times a week during that period. I now quote a passage from the learned Magistrate's judgment:

After being in the chief assistant district officer's office for half-an-hour, that officer requested the appellant to leave his room as there were others outside his office who were waiting to see him. He told the appellant that he would have to call the police if he did not leave. The appellant dared him to do so and stood up and banged his file on the table. He then raised his fists and challenged the officer to a fight. He said that he could even call in his wife, and just then the wife rushed in with her hands ready for a fight. Both of them were threatening the said officer and he realised then that he had to call in the police.

Subsequently the police arrived and the appellant was apprehended. From the record, there is no doubt that the learned Magistrate disbelieved the appellant's version.

For an offence under s. 186 of the Penal Code the prosecution has to prove the following: (1) that there was obstructing of a public servant, (2) that the public servant was at that time discharging his public function, and (3) that the person obstructing did so voluntarily. It is in my view clear that to obstruct under s. 186 of the Penal Code is to do an act which makes it more difficult for a public servant to carry out his duties. I take that definition of "obstruction" from the case of Hinchliffe v. Sheldon [1955] 3 All ER 406, applied. It is therefore quite clear that the appellant was making it more difficult for the chief assistant district officer to discharge his public function and that the said officer was at that time involved in discharging his public functions. The only remaining element of the alleged offence is whether the obstruction was voluntary. That brings me to s. 39 of the Penal Code which defines "voluntarily" as,

A person is said to cause an effect 'voluntarily' when he causes it by means whereby he intended to cause it, or by means which, at the time of employing those means, he knew or had reason to believe to be likely to cause it".

The definition of the term "voluntarily" bears resemblance to the definition of "wilfully" current in the English law. (See Rattanlal, The Law of Crime, 21 Edn. p. 82). In Rice v. Connolly [1966] 2 All ER 649 at p. 651, applied Lord Parker, CJ said,

'Wilful' in this context in my judgment means not only 'intentional' but also connotes something which is done without lawful excuse.

It is clear in the present case that the appellant had a license to be in the chief assistant district officer's office. When he was told to leave, the licence expired and thenceforth he became a trespasser and consequently he had no lawful excuse for his presence in that office. In my judgment the learned Magistrate has given full effect to the law under s. 186 of the Penal Code. The appeal against conviction is dismissed.

I now come to sentence. It has been said over and over again that an appellate Court is reluctant to interfere in matters of sentence unless it can be shown to be manifestly excessive. Each case must be decided on its merits. For my part, I am of the opinion that the circumstances of this case do not warrant a severe sentence of three months. No harm has been done to anybody except the appellant himself. It is not improper to