McElwaine CJ:

The judgment of the Court was delivered by:

We gave leave to appeal in this case on two points-the admissibility of a report made to the police, and the effect on the case of shewing to the Jury a photograph of the first appellant from a police album of photographs.

As to the first point, Ng Poh Eng went to report to the police about mid-day. Inspector Roberts at 12.05 was informed and at once proceeded to the scene of the robbery, the upstairs of No. 30 Upper Hokkien Street. It is presumed that this first information given by Ng Poh Eng was not at that time reduced to writing, if it was, it was not put in evidence. In any case it is clear that this report set the police investigation in motion. At 1.50 p.m. Inspector Roberts took a report or statement from another witness Gan Bee Neo and it was this report which was put in evidence.

Mr. Storr relied on s. 119 of the Criminal Procedure Code as rendering the statement admissible. That section renders admissible copies of reports or information given under ss. 117or 118. But such copies are only admissible if the originals are admissible and are, equally with the originals, governed by s. 124 which enacts that no statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of a police investigation shall be used as evidence save as in that section provided. None of the exceptions applies in this case and the report was a statement made to a police officer in the course of a police investigation and as such was inadmissible. But Mr. Storr suggested that if his argument as to its general admissibility was unsound it was admissible on another ground. Gan Bee Neo had given evidence of the articles which had been stolen and Mr. Storr informed us that her statement was put in to corroborate this portion of her evidence as the statement contained similar details of her stolen property. Section 158 of the Evidence Ordinance certainly refers to such a previous statement as corroborative, though it really only shews consistency. Section 158 is very general in its terms and taken by itself, would certainly admit a statement made to an investigating police officer. But s. 124 of the Criminal Procedure Code specifically excludes statements made to police officers. Further, the Criminal Procedure Code is the later enactment.

Without giving a final decision on this point, which was not very fully argued, and assuming that the statement could be used to corroborate the witness, we think that only so much of it as gave particulars of the stolen jewellery should have been admitted. At least one part of the statement did not corroborate Gan Bee Neo. We do not think, however, that the admission of this document caused any serious prejudice.

The second point affects only the first appellant. The witness Ng Poh Eng was asked whether certain stones shewn to her were like stones she had lost in the robbery. Q "Are they anything like the stones - the same sized stones as in the locker?" A "Yes" Q "On the day of the robbery were you taken to the detective station?" A "Yes" Q "Were you shewn two books of photographs there?" A "Yes" Q "Did you pick out that photograph as being one of the people who came to your house?" A "Yes" Then the photograph Exh. P was shewn to the accused and to the jury.

Mr. Tremlett, Assistant Superintendent of Police, was asked Q. "Now in 1938 do you know if a photograph was taken of either of the accused ?" A "Yes, a photograph was taken of the first accused in 1938." Q "Is that P 7 ?" A "Yes" P 7 is an obvious police photo of the first appellant's profile and side face and attached to the collar was a label 3900/38. The first accused was in fact convicted in 1938.

The purpose of this evidence was to shew that the coat the appellant was wearing in the photograph was identical with a coat found in a box in which were also found the stones about which Ng Poh Eng had been questioned. It cannot be said that Ng Poh Eng had identified those stones as her