HYNDMAN-JONES, C.J., and FISHER, J.

We are of opinion that this case should be referred to the Magistrate with a direction that he receive the complaint of MASOODA PARES and hear the case which she desires to institute against ERNEST PAYNE.

In the case of Oona Ismail v. Mariott Unreported, we expressed no opinion as to whether a Magistrate acting under the provisions of s. 140 of the Criminal Procedure Code, ought or ought not to take a statement from the person accused. We were and we are inclined to leave that matter to the Magistrate's discretion. He is authorised by the section, if he see reasons to doubt the truth of a compliant, to record his reasons for doing so, postpone the issue of process and either inquire into the case himself or direct some Police Officer to do so for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint. We lay stress on the last words, because it is quite conceivable that in certain cases the explanation of an accused person may at once put an end to any further action; and we think that we should be unduly restricting the power of a Magistrate and fettering his discretion were we to lay down any hard and fast rule on this subject; moreover not authority was cited to us for so doing. Of course, it should always be borne in mind that an accused person is not bound to make any statement unless he desires to do so; and we are of opinion that, if it is proposed to take a statement from an accused person, he should, before making his statement, be apprised of this fact. So far as to the fist objection to the Magistrate's procedure.

Then it was urged that a Magistrate, if he doubt the truth of a complaint, is required by the section to record his reasons for doing so. The reasons recorded by the Magistrate in the present case are in these words: "There seems ground for supposing the" "accused was acting in the execution of his duty." And it was said that these words do no indicate that the Magistrate doubted the truth of the facts stated, but rather that he thought the accused has some legal ground of defence. But we may assume that the Magistrate had in his mind the definition of the word "complaint", in s. 2 of the Code , and that he doubted whether (under the circumstances disclosed) the allegation that the accused had committed an offence was true. We agree with the learned Attorney General that a Magistrate is not bound to follow slavishly the words of the section and note in so many words that he "doubts the truth of the complaint." and taking the word "complaint" as "meaning an allegation that some one has committed or is guilty of an offence," we think that he Magistrate's note, though undesirably meagre, is a sufficient compliance with the provisions of the section. Nevertheless, were are of the opinion that the case should go back to the Magistrate.

[Their Lordships then dealt shortly with the facts of the matter and the conflict of evidence before the Magistrate and concluded:-]

Now it is obvious that there were important questions of law and fact involved in the case which should have precluded the Magistrate, however anxious he may have been, as he says he was, to save the constable expense, from dealing with the case in that summary manner; and we are of opinion that his duty was to have issued process and let the case be tried in the usual way. We are unable to say on the material before us that there has been no miscarriage of justice, and accordingly the case must be sent back to the Magistrate.