JUDGMENTBY: WILLAN, CJ

In this case the appellant was convicted under Regulation 4(1)(a) of Emergency Regulations, 1948, for being in possession of a fire-arm, to wit a revolver, on the 18th July, 1948. Since the only punishment prescribed for such an offence is death, the appellant was sentenced to death.

The prosecution proved that the appellant and 4 other Chinese were stopped by the police on the night of 18th July, 1948, whilst travelling in a motor car. They were detained and searched. On the person of the appellant a house-key was found. Three days later, that is on the 21st July 1948, the appellant took a police Inspector to his, the appellants house, and after entry had been obtained by unlocking the house door with the key aforesaid, the appellant pointed out to the Police Inspector a revolver which was lying concealed in a cupboard.

Later, on the 21st July, 1948, the appellant made a statement to that Police Inspector, having been duly cautioned, and in that statement he gave two contradictory accounts of how he came to be in possession of the revolver. He first said that two Chinese had left the revolver with him for safe custody on the day he was arrested, but later in the same statement he said the revolver was his own property.

At his trial the appellant made a statement from the dock and therefore could not be subjected to cross-examination. Since the defence was that the appellant had voluntarily disclosed the whereabouts of the revolver to the police, that statement must be considered with care. That statement is as follows:--

On night of 18th July, 1948, two men Wong Foo and Wong Kwai Hong came

to my house and brought a small parcel. They said they wanted me to

keep it in the house for a night only and that they would take it away

in the morning. I asked them what the contents were. They said it was a

revolver. I told them they could not leave it, it was very dangerous.

They said it was only for a night and gave their word they would take

it away in the morning. I said "If you dont take it away then there

will be a lot of trouble". I was not co-operating with them, as they

didnt trust me any more. They went away in the car with me. We were

stopped at Selayang. On my arrest I was so frightened that I did not

know what to do or what to say, until two days later, when I thought,

if I did not disclose it, the two men might break into the house and

get the revolver and do more harm with it. This was the first time I

had ever seen a revolver. I never saw one in my life before. That is

all.

Ignoring the admission made by the appellant to the police that the revolver belonged to him, and giving the statement he made in Court a construction most favourable to the appellant, it is clear that his intention was to keep the revolver for the two men over-night and hand it back to them next morning. It was not his intention to hand it over to the police at that time, nor did he disclose any such intention until three days later when he pointed out the whereabouts of the revolver to the police. Hence there can be no doubt that the appellant was in possession of that revolver with the intention of handing it back to the two men who left it with him and with whom, on his own statement, he had previously been co-operating, but had since stopped such co-operation because they did not trust him any more.

The trial was complicated at the end by the Assessors adding a rider to their opinions that the appellant had acted under duress. This they did when in fact no express defence of duress had been submitted. The learned trial Judge could have quite properly rejected this rider of duress, because we cannot find any evidence to support it. But in spite of that, the learned trial Judge ex abundanti cautela directed the Assessors on the law relating to duress which is contained in section 94 of the Penal Code (Cap. 45) which is as foll

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