Hashim J:

The point for determination in this appeal is whether a charge can now be preferred for an offence under the Emergency Regulations, 1948.

The Emergency Ordinance, 1948 and subsidiary legislation by proclamation were repealed by LN 185 of 1960 with effect from 31 July 1960.

The respondent was charged on 3 February 1961 for an offence under Emergency (Registration Areas) Regulations, 1948 alleged to have been committed by him on 14 June 1960. He was arrested in Singapore on 2 February 1961 and charged in the Sessions Court, Kuala Lumpur on 3 February 1961. The case was heard on 10 May 1961 and at that hearing defence Counsel, Mr. Eugene Lye, raised an objection. He contended that as a result of LN 185 of 1960 the respondent could not be charged for an offence under a law which had been repealed. The learned President accepted this view and acquitted and discharged the respondent. The Public Prosecutor appealed against this order of the learned President.

Mr HS Ong, the DPP, argued the appeal on behalf of the Public Prosecutor and cited numerous authorities to support his contention that the respondent could be charged under the Emergency Regulations, 1948. 1 would only refer to two cases which, I think, are relevant in this appeal. They are Wicks v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1947] Ac 362 and Postlethwaite v. Katz 59 TLR 245. Viscount Simon's judgment in Wicks v. Director of Public Prosecutions seems to make it quite clear that a prosecution for an offence under a repealed Act can be commenced and a conviction had even after repeal. The effect of repeal is set out in s. 13 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance No. 7 of 1948. It keeps alive all obligations and the liabilities to penalties and the right to institute and carry on legal proceedings and enforce penalties. This section is identical in terms with s. 38 of the English Interpretation

Act, 1889 and s. 6 of the Indian General Clauses Act of 1897. In Postlethwaite v. Katz was held that a charge could be brought for an alleged offence against the order of 1939 committed while the order was in force although the proceedings were not begun until after the order had been revoked. Re TS Chockalingam 1945 Madras 521 it was held that the appellant, the editor of a vernacular daily paper "Dinasari", was rightly convicted though at the time of his prosecution there was no law in the statute book under which he had committed any offence in respect of the acts complained of. Kuppuswami Ayer J in his judgment said, inter alia, "the question as to whether an offence was committed or not depends on the state of the law when the offence was committed and not on the law as it is on the date on which the prosecution is started." In The PP v. Bondada Ramalingeswaraswamy 1949 (Madras) 271 it was ruled that the repeal of s. 7 of the War Risks (Goods) Insurance Ordinance [IX(9) of 1940] did not take away the right which the Crown had to initiate prosecutions for an offence committed when s. 7 had been in force.

Mr Eugene Lye, for the respondent, relied on the phrase "unless the contrary intention appears" in s. 13 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance, 1948. He argued that the wording of the proclamation ending the Emergency Regulations provided contrary intention which rendered s. 13 inapplicable. He quoted the following from the proclamation: "We are satisfied in manner hereafter appearing that the need for the said Ordinance has ended ........ declare that the need for the said Ordinance has ended." He did not cite any authorities in support of this contention. I find I am unable to agree with this view.

I am of the opinion that no contrary intention appears in the proclamation ending the Emergency Regulations Ordinance, 1948. On the contrary it would appear that the Government intended to continue with the use of identity cards vide the National Registration Act, 1959. Section 24 of the National Registration Act, 1959 is substantial