JUDGMENT

1. On 26th March, 1989 at 5 p.m. the appellant, with a friend PW4, took his motor cycle to Usaha Motor Works at Lot 88, Jalan Semariang, Kuching, for repair. The owner of the workshop, PW1 could not repair the motor cycle because all his workers were not present as it was a Sunday and the workshop was closed. A misunderstanding arose between PW1 and the appellant, which developed into a harrowing quarrel of some sort, an exchange of shouts. This was witnessed by PW4 and PW2, the wife of PW1, who was present in the shop clutching her baby. The appellant then approached PW2 with a parang which he held pointing to PW2's left shoulder and threatened to use it unless she gave him money. Frightened, and in fear of an injury to herself, she gave the appellant a RM100 bill which the appellant took and made his escape. [3]

2. The learned Magistrate found that the charge of extortion against the appellant proved, convicted and sentenced him to a term of two years imprisonment. The appellant appealed against both the order of conviction and sentence.

3. Learned counsel of the appellant, Mr. Shankar Ram listed several grounds in his appeal that can be summarised simply:-

a) ;that the ingredients of the offence of extortion under S 384 of the Penal Code had not been proved;

b) ;that there were inconsistencies in the evidence of PW1 and PW2; and

c) ;that the Magistrate had erred in law and facts in convicting the appellant without cogent, probable and corroborative evidence.

4. This is a clear-cut case where there are eye-witnesses who gave direct evidence of what took place in broad day light. There is ample evidence which is required to prove the ingredients in an offence of extortion under S 384 of the Penal Code. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal's Law of Crimes, 24th Edition, Vol. 2 (1998) at page 1876, states that the ingredients of extortion to be proved are as follows:-

1) ;The accused must put any person in fear of injury to that person, or any other person;

2) ;The putting of a person in such fear must be intentional;

3) ;The accused must thereby induce the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property, valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into valuable security; and

4) ;Such inducement must be done dishonestly.

Section 44 of the Penal Code gives a definition of injury:

"The word 'injury' denotes any harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation or property."

See Public Prosecutor v Kang Siew Chong (1968) 2 MLJ 39 . [4]

5. In the case, PW2 was put in fear of an injury caused by the appellant pointing a parang at her, and she was induced by fear that she did give the money to the appellant as he demanded. There was no suggestion that the appellant had business to collect the RM100 from PW2, that shows the appellant had acted unlawfully and quite dishonestly. It appears that all the ingredients of extortion had been proved and the learned Magistrate was correct in so holding. See Lee Choh Pet & Ors v Public Prosecutor (1972) 1 MLJ 187 (CA); Beh Tuck Seng v Public Prosecutor (1947) MLJ 197.

6. There is generally no necessity for corroboration. Corroboration goes only to the weight and value of the evidence unless it is a requirement of statute: S 34 Evidence Act, 1950. If corroboration is necessary, the evidence of PW1 and PW4 is an independent evidence which well corroborates the evidence of the complainant PW2. The mere fact that a witness, PW1, happens to be the husband of the complainant, does not ipsa facto turn him into an accomplice. See Pie Bin Chin v Public Prosecutor (1985) 1 MLJ 234 .

7. No particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for proof of any fact. It is clear that as a general rule, an accused person can be convicted on just one piece of direct evidence. In such a case, corroboration is not needed for the one piece of evidence from a single witness may be strong enough to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable d