Buttrose J:

This appeal raises an interesting point as to whether the rating provisions in the Local Government Ordinance 1957 (No 24 of 1957), which it was not disputed were inconsistent with the rating provisions in the Municipal Ordinance (Ch 133 of the 1936 Edn), had by implication repealed them.

The facts which were not in dispute were briefly as follows:

The respondents were the owners of No. 2 St Thomas Walk, Singapore, having purchased the property in September 1957 and the annual value on which the property had been assessed at that time was $2,880.

Pursuant to the provisions of s. 64 of the Municipal Ordinance a Notice dated 23 January 1958 to amend the annual value to $13,000 for the year 1958 was served by the appellant on the respondents the same day. The respondents were notified by the appellant on 5 May 1958 that the Assessment Committee of the appellant, at its meeting held on 22 April 1958, had fixed the annual value of the property at $13,000 with effect from 1 January 1958.

The position was that the Local Government Ordinance was enacted on 9 August 1957 and its purpose was to repeal and re-enact with amendments the Municipal Ordinance. All the provisions of the Local Government Ordinance, including those relating to rating, had been brought into operation by 21 December 1957 with one important exception, namely, s. 320(1) which provided for the repeal, inter alia, of the Municipal Ordinance.

It was argued on behalf of the respondents that as the provisions of the Local Government Ordinance relating to rating were subsequent to and inconsistent with those of the Municipal Ordinance they impliedly repealed them. Consequently, according to the respondents, they could not be assessed for the year 1958 under the Municipal Ordinance but only under the Local Government Ordinance and the Notice of amended assessment under s. 64 of the Municipal Ordinance dated 23 January 1958 was bad in law and the assessment dated 22 April 1958 made in consequence thereof, under the provisions of the same Ordinance, was null and void and of no effect in law.

It is important to bear in mind that the section which made provision for the repeal of the Municipal Ordinance, namely, s. 320(1), had not up to the date of the hearing of this appeal been brought into operation and, in my view, the failure to do so must be regarded as deliberate.

Here the Legislature had expressly enacted a provision repealing the Municipal Ordinance but had, it must be assumed, intentionally and deliberately refrained from bringing it into operation.

The stand taken by the appellant was, in effect, that the Municipal Ordinance and the Local Government Ordinance were in concurrent operation and that the former had neither expressly nor impliedly been repealed by the latter.

The position was unusual but the circumstances themselves regarding the transitional period and in relation to the formation of the new District Council Areas were peculiar and there would appear to be an undoubted practical necessity for the two Ordinances to be in concurrent operation, despite some inconvenience which would be caused.

By its deliberate act in not bringing into operation the section repealing the whole of the Municipal Ordinance the Legislature had, in my opinion, clearly indicated its intention to keep the Ordinance alive.

Furthermore, repeal by implication has never found favour in the Courts and such an interpretation is to be avoided unless inevitable. The case of Lewis v. Berry [1936] 1 Ch 274, to which we were referred, indicates that any reasonable construction which offers an escape from such an interpretation is more likely to be in accord with the real intention.

In my opinion there is no room in this case for the application of the doctrine of implied repeal and even if it could be invoked it would, I consider, be inexpedient and impracticable to do so.

An alternative argument was addressed to us that even if the Municipal Ordinance was