Terrell A-G CJ:

In this case the accused was convicted under s. 304 A of the Penal Code of having caused the death of a negro by driving his car negligently. The Court has the advantage of a very careful record of the evidence, and of a very full and careful Judgment, giving all the learned Magistrate's reasons for arriving at his verdict.

These circumstances were also of considerable value to the appellant whose Counsel was able to subject the grounds of judgment to a microscopic examination, and attack them from various angles.

I will now deal with the principal grounds of appeal.

1. Admittedly the two eye witnesses for the prosecution PC 1871, who was on traffic duty at the junction of Coleman Street and North Bridge Road, and Hodgins, who had a bird's eye view of the whole accident from his flat at 16 Meyer Mansons situated at the same junction, differed in certain respects. The learned Magistrate accepted both witnesses as witnesses of truth, but finally accepted the testimony of Hodgins as being an accurate record of what happened.

Mr. Braddell advanced the proposition that in circumstances where a Magistrate believes both witnesses and they contradict one another, the prosecution case has not been established beyond reasonable doubt, and the accused is entitled to an acquittal. No authority was cited in support of this proposition which appears to be quite untenable. The fact is that having two accounts before him which differed in material respects, the learned Magistrate accepted the evidence of Hodgins in preference to that of the PC, not because he thought the PC was a liar, but because he considered him honestly mistaken or inaccurate in his observation or memory. I know of no rule of law which could prevent a Magistrate from so deciding.

2. It is argued that there was no evidence of criminal negligence except that the accused had passed the traffic policeman when the "wings" were against him, and that the Court Inspector had expressly stated in opening his case that it was not suggested that the negligence which caused the death of the man was the same negligence as led to the disobeying of the wing signal.

In my opinion the Inspector's statement was strictly accurate so far as it went, but that is not to say that the improper passing of the traffic post was not an element to be taken into consideration. There was no question that the accused's car caused the death of the negro, but what the prosecution have to establish is a criminal intention, - in this case a high degree of negligence. Such intention can be established by the accused's conduct at or immediately before the event. Under s. 8 of the Evidence Ordinance the accused's previous conduct is expressly made relevant, and under s. 14 the existence of a state of mind is also relevant. The latter section is of particular importance with reference to the statement made by the accused to Hodgins when the latter asked him why he was driving at such a speed past the policeman, the reply being that the accused was in a hurry and had an appointment in Tanjong Pagar or Pasir Panjang. Reference may also be made to s. 115 of the Evidence Ordinance. The collision occurred within 50 yards of the junction. The time taken to traverse this distance would be just over four seconds, if the car was travelling at 20 mph, and just under four seconds if the car were travelling at 25 mph. It may be presumed that the state of mind which existed when the junction was crossed persisted at the time of the accident. It is contrary to common sense to suggest that the crossing of the junction against the traffic signal, and the impact with the negro four seconds later, were two entirely independent occurrences, unconnected in any way.

In my opinion, therefore, the learned Magistrate was correct in taking the accused's conduct immediately before the collision into consideration. But this was not the only evidence of negligence. If the evidence of Hodgins is accepted, the