SPROULE, J. - This appeal was dismissed by us as being an appeal from a final order within the meaning of section 30 for the Land Acquisition Ordinance, No. 49. My Brother DEANE J. held that there could be no appeal at all, whether of law or fact, in any case where the Judge and one or both assessors agree. REAY J. and I were agreed that section 30 in such a case only debarred an appeal on fact or quantum and not on law or principle, but that the present appeal could not be entertained by reason of its being essentially one of fact or quantum. We delivered oral judgments, but promised to file written grounds for the purposes of record and report.

The sole ground of appeal was that the award was against the weight of evidence; but the appellant sought to add a second ground, that the method of assessment was wrong and unfair to the appellant, in that an average over all ways struck, whereas separate valuation of the various properties acquired should have been made, based on the evidence as to analogous instances.

Mr. Braddell for the appellant explained exactly what he meant by this added ground of appeal. The land acquired consisted of a block partly built upon, partly vacant owing to demolition. The Collector gave a higher rate in respect of two neighbouring houses than the chief Justice and assessors (all three were in agreement) allowed in respect of the built on land in dispute. Appellant claimed to be allowed the same or a better rate, on the ground that the Collector should be bound by his own analogous valuations. As to the vacant land, appellant similarly claimed that the Collector of Land Revenue's rate in respect of a certain piece of vacant land across the road should be applied to his own. All this evidence and a great deal more was before the Judge and assessors. I found, and REAY J. agreed with me, that there was no principle at all involved, and no question not purely of fact and of quantum.

As to the right of appeal as affected by section 30, and my ruling that questions of law or of principle were appealable, it is relevant to consider the changes made by the present Ordinance of 1920 from the law as it was under the former Land Acquisition Ordinance of 1890.

I start with the fundamental proposition that there could be no right of appeal at all from orders made under the Ordinance save by express provision. Apart from general ground, it must be remembered that the hearing before a Judge and two assessors is itself in the nature of an appeal from the Collector's award, made after an inquiry which, after all, is in the nature of a judicial proceeding.

The framers of the Old Ordinance appear to have borne this principle in mind, and gave very restricted rights to appeal under Part III of the Ordinance. Section 27 provided that in case of a different of opinion between Judge and both assessors upon a question of law or practice or usage having the force of law, the opinion of the Judge should prevail and there should be no appeal therefrom. A fortiori, there could be no appeal on a question of law of the kind where there was no such difference of opinion.

Section 28 enacted that if the Judge and one or both assessors agreed as to the amount of the compensation or of any item thereof, their decision thereon should be final. The Judge could over-ride the decision of both assessors as to the amount of compensation or of any item thereof. It was only in this last event of over-riding of both assessors by the Judge, and then only if the award exceeded $5,000, that a right of appeal was given by the old section 34.

Reading section 27 with section 34, it seems clear that the old Ordinance only allowed (restricted) appeal on facts and quantum, but none on law. It is idle now, after its repeal, to consider whether under that heading of fact and quantum any item of the total amount might not have been attacked upon alleged grounds of improper rejection or admission of evidence, having regard to the principl