Gopal Sri Ram JCA:

[1]This is the judgment of the court.

[2]The appellant was originally charged for the offence of murder under s. 302 of the Penal Code. However, at the commencement of his trial an amended charge under s. 304(a) of the Penal Code was tendered by the prosecution. The accused pleaded guilty to the amended charge. He was sentenced to 19 years imprisonment with effect from date of arrest. He has appealed to us on the measure of sentence. His complaint is that the sentence is manifestly excessive.

[3]The facts of this case are straightforward. The victim, a lady was on her way home when she was accosted by the appellant who was riding a motorcycle. He made advances to her which she repelled. She then ran into her home and was pursued by the appellant who killed her with a hammer. The medical evidence shows that the victim died from a single blow to her head. Under these circumstances it can hardly be contested that the offence was committed in a most brutal fashion. It was suggested by learned counsel for the appellant that there was provocation in this case. It was also submitted that the sentencing court had taken into irrelevant considerations and failed to take into account relevant considerations when passing sentence upon the appellant. We have scrutinised the record most anxiously, in particular the judgment under the appeal and we find no merit whatsoever in this complaint.

[4]The facts placed before the court below revealed that there was no provocation offered by the victim. If any provocation was offered, it came from the appellant.

[5]Learned counsel has also argued, citing a number of authorities in support, that the appellant being a first offender, his plea of guilt ought to have entitled him to about one third discount when determining the measure of sentence. The decision of the Supreme Court in Mohamed Abdullah Ang Swee Kang v. Public Prosecutor [1987] 2 CLJ 405; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 209 was relied upon in support of this submission. We would note at once that Mohamed Abdullah Ang Swee Kang v. Public Prosecutor was a case concerning criminal breach of trust and not a violent crime. And, as Hashim Yeop A. Sani J (later Chief Justice of Malaya) said in Public Prosecutor v. Loo Choon Fatt; [1976] 2 MLJ 256, when it comes to the imposition of punishment, each case depends on its own facts.

[6]In our judgment whether a plea of guilt constitutes a mitigating factor would depend largely on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. Where there is a course of circumstances similar to those that have occurred here, a plea of guilt, having regard to the seriousness of the case, carries little weight. As Karthigesu JA said when delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Singapore in Fu Foo Tong v. Public Prosecutor [1995] 1 SLR 448:

It is not axiomatic that every plea of guilty 'entitles', as it was contended by counsel to a discount of between one-quarter to one-third of what might otherwise be considered an appropriate sentence after a trial. A plea of guilt can be of no mitigating value, for example, when the evidence overwhelmingly supports a conviction.

[7]Ordinarily in a case of this sort the maximum sentence of 20 years would have been imposed. It is entirely possible that the sentence of 19 years imposed reflects the intention of the learned judge to take into account the appellant's plea of guilt.

[8]In our judgment, the correct approach to be taken where the maximum or near maximum sentence is warranted is that set out in the judgment of Yong Pung How CJ in Sim Gek Yong v. Public Prosecutor [1995] 1 SLR 537. The learned Chief Justice of Singapore expressed a view with which we respectfully agree. This is what his Honour said:

The principles espoused above in R v. Tait and Bartley [1979] 24 ALR 473 and Bensegger v. R [1979] WAR 65 represent, in my view, the approach which should be adopted by a court towards the issue of maximum sentences. To restrict the maximum sentence to the