Richard Malanjum JCA:

[1] This is an appeal against the decision made by the High Court on 16 July 1998 refusing to set aside its earlier order made on 13 March 1995. The earlier order was a default order which allowed the respondent to auction four parcels of land along Jalan Stonor Kuala Lumpur belonging to the appellant who failed to settle assessments taxes, warrant penalties plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum from 1 October 1994 until full payment with costs. It was also in the earlier order that the balance of the sale proceeds of the auction would be paid to the relevant parties in accordance with s. 151(3) of the Local Government Act 1976.

[2] In its application to set aside the earlier order the appellant relied on several grounds, both technical and substantially on the interpretation of ss. 148 and 151 of the Local Government Act 1976. None of the grounds persuaded the learned High Court Judge. At the same time the learned High Court Judge allowed the recitals in the earlier order to be rectified on the application by the respondent.

[3] Before us the appellant relied on the same issues as canvassed before the High Court. While resisting the appeal the respondent also raised a preliminary objection at the outset of the hearing.

[4] After hearing the arguments on the preliminary objection we dismissed it. We do not think it has any merit. The errors referred to were typographical errors. In any event it was not shown to us that the respondent suffered injustice and prejudice as a result of such errors or non-compliance to the Rules of the Court of Appeal. Further, we bear in mind r. 102 of the Rules of the Court of Appeal which provides that 'non-compliance with any of these Rules, or with any rule of practice for the time being in force, shall not render any proceedings void unless the court or judge shall so direct, but such proceeding may be set aside either wholly or in part as irregular, or amended, or otherwise dealt with in such manner and upon such terms as the court or judge shall think fit'.

[5] On the appeal proper learned counsel for the appellant complained that the learned High Court Judge went beyond her role in an adversarial system by investigating the error in the earlier order when it should be the obligation of the respondent to make the necessary application to rectify the error. With respect we do not think there is any merit in this complaint. In any event the respondent did make an application albeit subsequently.

[6] Next, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the learned High Court Judge erred in not reading together ss. 148 and 151 of the Local Government Act in order to determine the intention of the legislature. By attributing to the word 'may' as found in s. 148 as merely directory rather than mandatory, the learned High Court Judge failed to consider the implication arising from the opening words in s. 151.

[7] We have considered this argument and with respect to the learned High Court Judge we think there is valid basis for it. In view of the words used in the sections we are of the opinion that the two sections should be read together if the intention of the Legislature is to be given any effect.

[8] Indeed 'in the deliberation to ascertain legislative intention, the court has to be mindful that the Act, taken as a whole and the general object intended to be secured by the Act, as viewed from the context of the particular provision involved, has to be considered and if such provision has a proviso, both the provision and the proviso are to be read in such a manner that they mutually throw light on each other and result in a harmonious construction'. (See: Shell Malaysia Trading Sdn Bhd v. Pemungut Duti Setem, Pulau Pinang [1998] 1 CLJ Supp 126).

[9] Reverting to the appeal at hand no doubt s. 148 begins with this phrase:

For the recovery of an arrear the local authority may issue a warrant of attachment in Form F ... .

[10] However, the opening words of s. 1