Abdul Aziz J:

This is an application by way of motion for rule absolute requesting that this Court do "grant an order of prohibition to stay proceedings in the first respondent Court (Industrial Court) in respect of Case No. 5 of 1968" on the ground that the Industrial Court lacked or was acting in excess of its jurisdiction.

The affidavits show that the dispute referred to the Industrial Court under s. 8(4) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 concerned two rival trade unions, the Kesatuan Pekerja 2 Kenderaan Sri Jaya (KPKSJ) and the Kesatuan Pekerja 2 Pengangkutan (KPP) both claiming to represent the employees of the Sri Jaya Transport Company and both seeking recognition by the company. For the purposes of proceedings, which apparently was initiated by KPP, KPKSJ was ordered to be joined as a party under s. 9(2).

The relevant portions of the interim award could be summarised as follows:-

(a) That the Ministry of Labour be invited to conduct a secret ballot amongst the workers of the company to determine which of the two unions should represent them in relation to wages and other conditions of services;

(b) If the greater number of votes in the ballot is in favour of KPP, the company would accord that union general recognition and grant to KPKSJ limited recognition;

(c) If the greater number of votes in the ballot is in favour of KPKSJ, then general recognition be accorded to that union, and KPP be accorded limited recognition;

(d) That the parties be at liberty to make representations in relation to the conduct of the ballot.

A secret ballot was accordingly conducted and the ballot was found to be in favour of KPP. The KPKSJ filed an objection as to the conduct of the ballot, but later withdrew the objection and subsequently filed this motion for order of prohibition.

The applicant's case is that by reason of s. 10 the Industrial Court lacked jurisdiction in hearing the case and making the award. s. 10 reads:-

Where a trade union has been accorded recognition in respect of any workman or class of workmen by a decision of the Court or otherwise no other trade union shall make any claim for recognition in respect of the same workman or class of workmen unless a period of two years has elapsed after such recognition has been accorded or the trade union which has accorded recognition is no longer in existence.

Applicant claims - and this has not been disputed - that some time in February 1968 the company by letter recognised KPKSJ as representing a larger number of workers than KPP and accordingly agreed to recognise KPKSJ as representing the workers of the company. It is agreed that, since under s. 10 recognition could be accorded otherwise than by the Court e.g. by the employer, the Industrial Court has no further jurisdiction to determine the question of recognition.

I do not propose to deal, in extenso, with the innumerable cases dealing with the principles governing the issue on orders of prohibition. Suffice for me to quote a passage from Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Ed, vol 11 at p. 55:-

Prohibition will lie to bodies and persons other than Courts stricto sensu. Any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, is subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice.

It has not been disputed that the Industrial Court is subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the High Court although I would not call it an inferior Court. It is in constitution, power and scope a superior Court, but with limited jurisdiction. Its decision is not subject to appeal or review. [s. 29(3)(a)]. In making its award, the Industrial Court may, in contrast to ordinary Courts, have regard to public interest, the financial implications and the effect of such award on the economy of the country, and on the industry concerned, and also to the probable effect in related or similar industries. [s. 27(4)]. It shall also act i