This appeal raises a question of some interest regarding the application of the law relating to estoppel in circumstances which are regrettably common in this country.

The facts have never been in dispute.

One Inder Singh obtained judgment against one Hussain bin Nemar for $3,000. By way of execution on that judgment the Sheriff attached a motor-car, registration number SF. 5204. That motor-car was registered in the name of Hussain and was being used by him as a taxi. It was, however, the property of one Chan Kong Choy who had bought it and paid the insurance premiums on it but had had it registered in the name of Hussain because Hussain would be able to get a public service vehicle permit which Chan Kong Choy for some reason which has not been stated was unable to do

When the car was attached, Chan Kong Choy claimed it and as his claim was resisted by the execution creditor the Sheriff commenced interpleader proceedings in which Chan Kong Choy was treated as plaintiff and Inder Singh as defendant.

As has been said, the trial Judge came to the conclusion that although the car belonged to Chan Kong Choy it had been registered in the name of Hussain in order to obtain a public service vehicle permit and this in effect involved a fraud on the public administration of the country. He was of the opinion that not only the Registrar of Motor Vehicles but also Inder Singh had been misled and that as a result of being thus misled Inder Singh had expended money on effecting the attachment of the car. In the circumstances he took the view that Chan Kong Choy was estopped from denying that the car belonged to Hussain and he dismissed his claim accordingly with costs.

Against that decision Chan Kong Choy has now appealed.

The law relating to estoppel in this country is set out in section 115 of the Evidence Ordinance and the law thus set out is the same as in England. As was said by Lord Shand in the case of Sarat Chunder Dey v Gopal Chunder Laha (1892) 19 IA 203, 215; ILR 20 Cal 296, 310 their Lordships entirely adopted the view that 'the terms of the Indian Evidence Act did not enact as law in India anything different from the law of England on the subject of estoppel', (and see Mercantile Bank of India Ltd v Central Bank of India Ltd [1938] AC 287, 304;

Section 115 (which is the same as section 115 of the Indian Act) reads as follows:-

"When one person has by his declaration, act or omission intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief otherwise than but for that belief he would have acted, neither he nor his representative in interest shall be allowed in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative in interest to deny the truth of that thing."

That statement of the law might on the face of it well justify the late Sir Frederick Pollock's description of the doctrine of estoppel (as quoted by Lord Wright [ 53 LQR p 161.]) as 'a simple and wholly untechnical conception.' But although the conception by itself may be simple and untechnical its application by the Courts to individual sets of circumstances can scarcely be said to justify either of these epithets. An example of the confusion which still exists regarding this branch of the law is to be found in the case of Mercantile Bank of India, Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, Ltd., supra, where the Privy Council (per Lord Wright) refused to follow their earlier decision (per Lord Shaw) in the case of Commonwealth Trust Ltd v Akotey [1926] AC 72; [1925] All ER Rep 270.

In the circumstances I am reluctant to embark on any lengthy a priori examination of the doctrine with a view to ascertaining its application in the present case and I think I am absolved by the existence of authority from any necessity for attempting the task. Here I would add in fairness to Azmi J., that he might well have taken the same course as I am about to take had counsel seen fit to bring to his notice the case I am