Rose CJ:

This is an appeal against a judgment allowing an application to enforce an award made by an arbitrator.

The arbitrator was appointed in pursuance of an arbitration agreement between Mohamed Ibrahim, the respondent in the present appeal, and one MA Koshi Mohamed. The award in question was made on 25 September 1961 and on 7 October 1961 the said MA Koshi Mohamed died. By an order of Court made on 4 December 1961 his widow was made a party to these proceedings.

The application to enforce the award was made by originating summons and at one stage in the proceedings it was contended that this procedure was wrong and that the application should have been made by motion. This point, however, was not pressed before this Court on appeal. I would observe that I see no reason to believe that the learned trial Judge was wrong in holding that an application for the enforcement of an award under the Arbitration Ordinance can properly be made by originating summons.

The point taken on appeal was that the order made on 25 September 1961 was not really an award at all and that therefore no application for its enforcement could be entertained.

It is therefore necessary to consider the history of the matter.

Mr AP Rajah, an advocate and solicitor, was appointed to act as arbitrator on 2 September 1960 to determine matters of dispute arising in connection with the partnership agreement between the respondent and the said MA Koshi Mohamed. A preliminary meeting was held on 14 October 1960 and the first hearing took place on 1 August 1961 when certain interim orders were made by consent.

A further hearing was held on 16 September 1961 when learned Counsel who was at that time appearing for the appellant asked for and obtained an adjournment to 25 September. On 25 September the arbitrator made the following order:-

I ORDER that the business at the close of today's showing be handed over by the first partner to the second partner (the second partner becoming the sole proprietor of the business as from the end of to-day's showings).

Accounts have been rendered by the first partner up till 31 July 1961. He has been running the business from 1 August 1961 to 25 September 1961 (both days inclusive). Mr. Francis asks that accounts for this period be filed before the next hearing at least one week before the hearing. Mr. Goho agrees.

My consent hearing fixed for 26 and 27 October 1961. The accounts for period 1 August 1961 to 25 September 1961 to be filed on or before 19 October 1961.

Falsifications and surcharges to be put in before 26 October 1961.

The issues raised in the two statements of the first and second partners will be dealt with. Then the accounts will be gone into.

It is true that the arbitrator described his decision as an order and not an award but when cross-examined by learned Counsel for the respondent in this Court he said: "I made an order and I intended it to be binding on the parties."

"Award" is not a term of art; and it seems to me that the test as to whether an award, be it final or interim, has been made must depend upon whether the order in question amounts to a decision. The principle is stated in the 16th Edn of Mr. Russell's book on Arbitration at p. 224: "any form of words amounting to a decision of the questions referred will be good as an award. No technical expressions are necessary."

It seems to me that the order of 25 September does amount to a decision of some of the questions referred and that, although the order is of an interim nature, it nonetheless should be regarded as an "award".

For these reasons I am of opinion that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.

Buttrose and Wee Chong Jin JJ concurred.

Appeal dismissed.