Ambrose J:

The four above-named appellants were charged with the offence of gaming in public under s. 7(2) of the Common Gaming Houses Ordinance, 1961. It was alleged that they on or about 22 November 1962, at about 10.30 p.m. at a coffee-stall at Kitchener Road, Singapore, did game in a public place by playing a game of mahjong with chips. They were convicted and sentenced to a fine of $40 each by a Magistrate.

Two points were taken by Counsel for the appellants. The first was that the hall where the offence was alleged to have been committed was not a public place. It was said that the coffee-stall was in the front portion of the premises and closed at 9 p.m.; that the hall ceased to be part of the coffee-stall after 9 p.m.; and that the public had no right of access to it. It was argued that a place cannot be said to be a public place unless the public have a right of access. Counsel relied on the case of Brannan v. Peek [1947] 2 All ER 572. In that case it was decided that a public house is not a public place within the meaning of s. 1(4) of the Street Betting Act, 1906, because, it is not a place to which the public have an unrestricted or a restricted right of access. Section 1(4) provides:

the word 'public place' shall include any public park, garden, or seabeach, and any unenclosed ground to which the public for the time being have unrestricted access, and shall also include every enclosed place (not being a public park or garden) to which the public have a restricted right of access, whether on payment or otherwise, if at or near every public entrance there is conspicuously exhibited by the owners or persons having the control of the place a notice prohibiting betting therein.

It is to be observed that s. 2(1) of the Common Gaming Houses Ordinance, 1961, provides:

'public place' means any place to which the public has or may have access .... ;

'place' means any house, office, room or building and any place or spot, whether open or enclosed,.....;"

To prove that the hall was a public place, the prosecution did not have to prove that the public had a right of access, restricted or otherwise, into the hall. All that the prosecution had to prove was that the hall was a place to which the public has or may have access. The Magistrate found that the hall was such a place. I can see no reason for setting aside that finding.

The second point taken by Counsel for the appellants was that the prosecution did not prove that the players were playing for money or money's worth. The prosecution was entitled, however, to rely on the presumption contained in s. 7(7) of the Ordinance. This subsection provides:

Where it is shown that any person has been found to be playing any game of chance or any mixed game of chance and skill in a public place, it shall be presumed until the contrary is proved that such person was gaming in such public place.

"Gaming" means the playing of any game of chance or of mixed chance and skill for money or money's worth. The prosecution evidence was that no money passed but that chips were used. The defence evidence was that the game was not for money or money's worth and that the first, third and fourth appellants were merely teaching the second appellant how to play mahjong. This evidence was disbelieved by the Magistrate; and it failed to raise any doubt in the Magistrate's mind as to the guilt of the appellants. In the circumstances I find no ground for complaint.

For the above reasons I dismiss the appeal and affirm the convictions and sentences.

Appeal dismissed.