Wee Chong Jin CJ:

The appellant was charged with assisting in the carrying on of a public lottery, to wit, a "characters lottery" and at the conclusion of the trial he was found guilty and sentenced to a fine of $750 or three months imprisonment in default.

During the hearing of the appeal the learned Solicitor-General indicated to the Court that he was not seeking to support the conviction on the evidence and accordingly without Counsel for the appellant completing his argument on the facts the appeal was allowed with one member of the Court dissenting.

A point of law on the discretionary exclusion of evidence illegally obtained was however raised by the appellant and was fully argued before us and the Court indicated that it would give its opinion at a later date.

Two police officers on the instructions of a superior officer entered the appellant's shop which deals in textiles, provisions and cigarettes for the express purpose of entrapping the appellant into accepting their stakes in a 10,000 characters lottery.

On entering the shop one of the officers asked to buy sugar and, when told by the appellant that he was not selling sugar, asked whether he could buy some numbers in a lottery commonly referred to as the 10,000 characters lottery. As a result this officer purchased $3 worth in this lottery. He then left the shop, told his superior officer of what had taken place and the latter then raided the shop under the authority of a search warrant, seized certain articles and cash and arrested the appellant.

It is not in dispute that the senior police officer sent a subordinate into the shop to commit an offence for the purpose of getting evidence against someone in that shop and in order that an offence by another person may be detected. Counsel for the appellant rightly concedes that evidence obtained in this manner, if relevant, was in law admissible (per Goddard CJ in Kuruma v. The Queen [1955] AC 197; [1955] 1 All ER 236 at p. 203).

Another proposition put forward by Counsel for the appellant and which is not in dispute is that in every criminal case a Judge has a discretion to disallow evidence, even if in law relevant and therefore admissible, if admissibility would operate unfairly against an accused. (Kuruma v. The Queen, supra, and Callis v. Gunn [1963] WLR 931; [1963] 3 All ER 677).

It is undisputed law therefore that while evidence unlawfully obtained is admissible if relevant, there is a judicial discretion to disallow such evidence, if its reception would operate unfairly against an accused.

Counsel for the appellant however seeks to establish a further proposition namely that in the exercise of its discretion and as a matter of public policy the Court will normally, though not necessarily, exclude evidence obtained by law enforcement officers by consciously unlawful means.

This is a proposition I find myself unable to accept. First, it is a proposition not supported by any authority which is binding on this Court though there are dicta in some Scottish cases and in a dissenting judgment of Holmes J of the Supreme Court of the United States of America cited by Counsel for the appellant which appear to lend some support to it.

Secondly, the use of the doctrine of public policy has consistently been frowned upon by the Courts. Burrough J (quoting Hobart CJ) said of it in Richardson v. Mellish 2 Bing at p. 252 "Public policy is an unruly horse, and difficult to ride." Parke B said of it in Egerton v. Brownlow 4 HLC at p. 123 "Public policy is a vague and unsatisfactory term.... ; it is capable of being understood in different senses, it may, and does, in its ordinary sense, mean `political expedience', or that which is best for the common good of the community; and in that sense there may be every variety of opinion, according to education, habits, talents, and dispositions of such person, who is to decide, whether an act is against public policy or not. To allow this to be a ground of judicial de