In this case the appellant, an Inspector of Police, was charged under section 165 of the Penal Code with accepting $50 without consideration from one Hanifa against whom a charge of attempted rape was withdrawn.

The appellant was convicted and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. He now appeals.

There was ample evidence, if accepted by the learned District Judge, to support the conviction. He found that the complainant Hanifa was a truthful witness and he accepted his evidence. He did not believe the appellant and came to the conclusion that he had lied throughout. He described the appellant's defence as an ingenious attempt to explain away the evidence against him which raised no doubt in his mind as to the appellant's guilt.

Notwithstanding this, however, it was submitted that the learned District Judge had erred in law in admitting certain evidence and misdirected himself on a number of matters.

The evidence as to the appellant's conduct with reference to the complainant's property was in my opinion admissible. The prosecution evidence disclosed that the complainant, Hanifa, a glazier employed by the Public Works Department was arrested by the appellant on the 3rd October 1957 on a charge of attempted rape and taken to the Joo Chiat Police Station. The appellant after questioning the complainant took from him his watch, gold wrist band and glass cutter and he was then detained in the lock-up. After leaving the appellant but before being put into the lock-up another police officer took possession of the remainder of the complainant's belongings such as his diary and measuring tape.

The complainant was released on bail the same evening and he informed one of his sureties, Gafor by name, that the appellant had taken his watch, wrist band and glass cutter.

Later the complainant made two or three abortive attempts to obtain the return of his property from the appellant who, at the outset had expressed a liking for and a desire to retain it.

On the 8th October the appellant who still retained possession of the articles asked the complainant to give him the gold wrist band and if he did so the case against him could be fixed up. The complainant declined and the appellant then returned the articles to him.

Subsequently on the 1st November the appellant, who had not apparently given up hope of obtaining the wrist band sent for the complainant and again asked him for the band indicating that he (the appellant) would make some arrangement concerning the case against the complainant. The appellant had in fact on that very day received instructions from the Deputy Public Prosecutor to have the charge against the complainant withdrawn. The complainant said he had pawned the band and the appellant thereupon substituted a demand for cash, the subject matter of the charge now preferred against him.

The whole of that evidence was, in my opinion, clearly part of the res gestae and was material and relevant. It is on an entirely different footing to evidence tending to show the previous bad character of an accused person which would have been inadmissible.

The evidence that the appellant's behaviour with regard to the complainant's property constituted a breach of Police General Orders was, in my opinion, inadmissible. While the relevant General Orders were not produced and secondary evidence as to their contents was wrongly admitted, section 440 of the Criminal Procedure Code I think covered the matter. The evidence, however, that the appellant's conduct did constitute a default of duty was inadmissible. While it is true that the learned District Judge referred briefly to this matter in his judgment I am quite satisfied that had the evidence been excluded he could not possibly have come to any other conclusion than the one which he did.

It was argued that hearsay evidence was wrongly admitted of statements which the complainant made to other witnesses in the absence of the appellant. Now this evidence to be admissible must come wit