Chua J (having stated the facts in the terms set out in the head notes above, continued):

In the Specification headed "Sanitary Fittings" which is in the Schedule to the Agreement the following appears:

Each house to be provided with one Belfast Kitchen Sink, one Lavatory Basin or Brackets, one WC pan with High Level Cistern. All these fittings will be connected to the water supply and Main Drainage System.

Mr. CH Smith, learned Counsel for the appellants, refers the Court to the Municipal (Water Supply) By-Laws, 1949 where it is provided (a) that communication pipes, which include the pipe between the main pipe of the City Council and the consumer's premises, shall be provided and laid by the City Council at the expense of the consumer (By-Law 62(6) and (b) that all meters will be supplied and fixed by the City Council and will remain the property of the City Council (By-law 63(1). Mr. Smith says that these two By-laws show that it is physically impossible for the appellants to lay the communication pipes and contends that the expression in the agreement "all these fittings will be connected to the Water Supply hellip;" means that the fittings will be connected to as far as the water meter as that is as far as the appellants can legally do. I am unable to accept this contention. I think the meaning of "will be connected to the Water Supply hellip;" is clear. It can only mean that the fittings will be connected to the water mains and although the appellants are not permitted under the Water Supply By-laws to lay the communication pipe nevertheless they must bear the cost of the City Council.

The question then arises whether the money paid by the respondent was paid under a mistake of law or under a mistake of fact. Mr. Smith contends that the respondent paid the money because she thought, rightly or wrongly, she had to pay it under the agreement and submits that if a party to a contract misunderstands his rights under it and pays money it is paid under a mistake of law and not of fact and cites as his authority the cases of Ord v. Ord; [1923] 2 KB 432. Stanley Brothers Ltd. v. Corp. of Nuneaton 108 LTR 986. Learned Counsel for the respondent, Mr. Tan Peng Khoo, on the other hand, contends that the mistake was a mistake of fact. He points out that from the evidence of the respondent it is clear that the respondent signed the agreement without knowing what its contents were as the respondent does not read English and the contents were not explained to her and she was not given a copy of the agreement and it was not until July 1955 that she was given a copy of the agreement. Mr. Tan says that the respondent was not aware of the clause relating to Sanitary Fittings in the agreement at the time she made the payment of $150, on 11 March 1955, to the appellants. So Mr. Tan argues it cannot be said that the respondent made a mistake of law as she did not know the contents of the agreement and he submits that she had made a mistake of fact. Mr. Tan also submits that as the contents of the agreement were not explained to the plaintiff that amounts to a misrepresentation and therefore the agreement was not binding on her he cites as his authority the case of Curtis v. Chemical Cleaning and Dyeing Co. [1934] 2 KB 394.

I think it is quite clear that when a party signs a contract knowing it to be a contract which governs the relations between them, then, to use the words of Denning J in the case of Curtis v. Chemical Cleaning and Dyeing Co., supra, "his signature is irrefragable evidence of his assent to the whole contract, including the exempting clauses, unless the signature is shown to be obtained by fraud or misrepresentation." In L'Estrange v. F Graucob Ltd. [1934] 2 KB 394. Scrutton LJ said "When a document containing contractual terms is signed, then, in the absence of fraud, or, I will add, misrepresentation, the party signing it is bound, and it is wholly immaterial whether he has read the document or not."

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