Vincent Ng J:

[1] Now for determination is the petitioner's application under encl. 178 to cite the second and fourth respondents (said respondents) for contempt of court due to allegedly false statements in certain affidavits, which I shall hereafter elaborate.

[2] Before I consider the factual merits of this application it is appropriate to bear in mind the following principles of law. It is trite law that due to the quasi criminal nature of the contempt proceedings now before me, a heavy onus now rests with the petitioner to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt. The said respondents have a legal right (as I have earlier ruled in respect of encl. 186) not to submit themselves to cross-examination. Considering that one of the reasons underpinning the ratio in Comet Products is that the application for leave to cross-examine could be for a collateral purpose or could lead to a pre-trial fishing expedition, I hold that the said respondents refusal for cross-examination should not be taken against them through the contents of their affidavits being disregarded or any adverse inference drawn against them on the question of weight to be attached to the said respondents' affidavits in determining encl. 178. Thus, the particular passage (at p. 75) in Comet Products U.K. Ltd ([1971] 2 QB 67) relied on by the petitioner is clearly obiter dictum and should not be applicable in determining a citation for contempt where a criminal standard of proof has to be applied. The passage reads: "Seeing, however, that cross-examination is not to be allowed, it means that the judge might think it right to disregard the affidavit, or to give it very little weight."

[3] Of the 3 ingredients that the petitioner must prove, the two most vital ingredients, besides actus reus, are mens rea and whether the actus reus was committed with the actual or inevitable intention of frustrating or obstructing the administration of justice. For consideration are the petitioner's three complaints that: (i) the second respondent admitted to the existence of the 1995 Agreement and the Master Settlement Agreement ('MSA') "only after it was uncovered by the petitioner"; (ii) there were "inconsistencies made by the second respondent as to the shareholding of Chen J-F (third respondent)" in his affidavits as compared to his testimony in the Utah Court transcripts; and (iii) the uncovering of the 1995 Agreement also indicates that the said respondents had made "false and misleading statements as to the allegation of diversion of business opportunity to Extra Excellence Manufacturing (Singapore) Pte Ltd".

[4] On the question whether the statement was intended to be false and misleading (mens rea) and whether it was made with actual or inevitable intent or consequence of frustrating or obstructing the administration of justice, this court would have to: (i) firstly, look at the relationship between the alleged false statements and the issues to be decided in the main proceedings. (See Keeley v. Brooking [1979] 25 ALR 45); (ii) secondly, bear in mind that unlike the offence of perjury, contempt requires the actual or inevitable intent or consequence of frustrating or obstructing the administration of justice (see Jaginder Singh [1983] CLJ (Rep) 176 at 179, Coward v. Stapleton [1953] 90 CLR 573, Re Bride, Ex-parte Steward [1984] WB 455, R v. Christopher Charles Murfett [2004] VSC 160 and Halsburys Laws of England, 4th edn, vol 9(1) pp 242-243); (iii) thirdly, be mindful that a "mere falsity of evidence is not enough to justify a contempt charge" (see Yee Sang Metal [2002] HKCU 1255); and, (iv) fourthly, be slow to draw inferences from affidavits as to the bona fides or mala fides of the alleged contemnor (see In Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304).

Re Complaint No. (i) (Non-Disclosure)

[5] The said respondents have explained the reasons for not disclosing the 1995 Distributorship Agreement and the MSA in paras. 13 to 16 of encl. 182A. The said respondents says th