Augustine Paul FCJ:

[1] The first respondent ("the respondent") was admitted and enrolled as an advocate and solicitor of the High Court on 15 December 1995. He commenced legal practice on 1 April 1996 and ceased to do so on 23 January 2001. He was appointed as a Chairman of the Industrial Court on 15 January 2004. Thus even though the respondent had been admitted and enrolled as an advocate and solicitor for eight years and one month at the date of his appointment he was in practice for only four years nine months and 22 days at that time. The critical issue for consideration in this case is whether the relevant period necessary to satisfy the requirements of s 23A(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 ("s 23A(1)") is the eight years and one month during which the respondent had been admitted and enrolled as an advocate and solicitor or the four years nine months and 22 days when he was in legal practice.

[2] This action was commenced by the appellant in the High Court challenging the appointment of the respondent as a Chairman of the Industrial Court on the ground that he did not satisfy the requirements of s 23A(1). The section reads as follows:

1

A person is qualified for appointment as President under s 21(1)(a) and as Chairman under s 23(2) if, for the seven years preceding his appointment, he has been an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of the Legal Profession Act 1976 or a member of the judicial and legal service of the Federation or of the legal service of a State, or sometimes one and sometimes another.

Section 3 of the Legal Profession Act 1976 ("s 3") defines an "advocate and solicitor" as:

In this Act unless the context otherwise requires:

'advocate and solicitor', and 'solicitor' where the context requires means an advocate and solicitor of the High Court admitted and enrolled under this Act or under any written law prior to the coming into operation of this Act;

It was the contention of the appellant in the High Court that the period of seven years stipulated in s 23A(1) is a reference to being in practice and not merely being admitted and enrolled as an advocate and solicitor for the said period. Learned counsel referred to cases such as Chor Phaik Har v. Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd, [1994] 3 MLJ 345 and Akberdin Hj Abdul Kader & Anor v. Majlis Peguam Malaysia; [2003] 1 MLJ 1; [2002] 4 CLJ 689; [2001] 4 AMR 4425 and argued that the purposive method of interpretation should be adopted in interpreting s 23A(1). The learned Senior Federal Counsel who appeared for the respondents contended that as the words of s 3 and s 23A(1) are clear and unambiguous it would be wrong in law to read into them a requirement for being in practice as what is stipulated is only for a person to have been admitted and enrolled as an advocate and solicitor for the required number of years.

[3] The learned Judicial Commissioner agreed with the appellant and ruled that the respondent was not a qualified person within the meaning of s 23A(1). As she said in her grounds of judgment:

Having considered both these submissions, I am inclined to agree with the Applicant's submissions. As mentioned in the Court of Appeal decision of Akberdin Hj Abdul Kader, the modern approach to interpreting statutes is by adopting the purposive approach. I also agree that in adopting the approach, this Court is entitled to refer to Hansard as an aid to interpretation when there is some ambiguity in the words of a statute or where a literal interpretation would lead to an absurdity. I believe that taking a literal approach to the provision in question would lead to an absurdity. The then Deputy Minister of Labour Dato' Wan Abu Bakar Wan Mohamad had this to say when addressing the President of the Senate during the introduction of Act A781:

Tuan Yang Di Pertua, perbicaraan di Mahkamah Perusahaan masa kini semakin menjadi lebih legalistic, dengan izin. Oleh itu, adalah dicadangkan Presiden dan semua Pengerusi Mahkamah Perusahaan hendaklah berkelulusan undan