Ambrose J:

This was a bankruptcy petition against a debtor who was a married woman at all material times. The act of bankruptcy alleged in the petition was noncompliance with a bankruptcy notice. The judgment on which the bankruptcy notice was based was in the form settled by the Court of Appeal in England in Scott v. Morley 20 QBD 120, 132, at p. 132. That form reads:

It is adjudged that the plaintiff do recover STG 227 and costs against the defendant, such sum and costs to be payable out of her separate property as hereinafter mentioned and not otherwise.

It was decided in Re Lynes [1893] 2 QB 113, that a bankruptcy notice cannot be issued in respect of a judgment in the Scott v. Morley form against a married woman who is carrying on a trade separately from her husband. The fact that the married woman concerned was carrying on a trade separately from her husband had nothing to do with the decision, apart from the fact that only such a married woman was subject to the bankruptcy laws then in force in England. The reason for the decision was this: a bankruptcy notice must call upon the debtor personally to pay the amount due on the judgment on which it is based; at the same time a bankruptcy notice must follow the terms of the judgment; where a judgment in the Scott v. Morley form has been obtained against a married woman, a bankruptcy notice requiring her to pay the judgment debt personally would not follow the terms of the judgment; such a judgment is not a judgment against her personally but a judgment against her separate property. It was said by Vaughan Williams J, in Re Hewett [1895] 1 QB 328, 331 at p. 331, that although in one sense such a judgment might be said to be a personal judgment, it is not one under which the married woman can be called upon personally to pay. In my view, the rule in Re Lynes applies in Singapore to any married woman and not merely to a married woman who is carrying on a trade separately from her husband.

Such was also the view of McElwaine CJ, in Re Manickam Ammal [1938] MLJ 88 , 93, 94, where he said at p. 93:

The judgment against a married woman in this Colony ought to be in the form prescribed in Scott v. Morley 20 QBD 120, 132............

Such a judgment debtor cannot be made bankrupt by means of a bankruptcy notice; Re Lynes [1893] 2 QB 113.

On the authority of Re Lynes, I held that the bankruptcy notice which was issued against the debtor in respect of a judgment in the i Scott v. Morley form was bad, and that, therefore, non-compliance with such a bankruptcy notice did not constitute an act of bankruptcy.

There was another reason why the bankruptcy petition could not be granted: the Court has no jurisdiction to adjudge a married woman bankrupt without proof that she has separate property. That was decided by Murison CJ, in Re Lim Quee Geok [1935] MLJ 3. The decision is based on what is now s. 120 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance, which reads:

A married woman shall in respect of her separate property, if any, be subject to this Ordinance in the same way as if she were unmarried.

The petitioning creditors did not dispute the statement in the debtor's affidavit that she had no separate property at the date of the hearing of the bankruptcy petition. I accepted her evidence, and held that the Court had no jurisdiction to adjudge her bankrupt.

In cross-examination, the debtor admitted that she had separate property during the coverture at the date of the judgment against her, out of which the judgment could be satisfied. Counsel for the petitioning creditors contended that that was enough, and that it was not necessary for the debtor to have separate property at the time of the hearing of the bankruptcy petition. Counsel relied on the following passage from the judgment of McElwaine CJ, in Re Manickam Ammal, at p. 94:

Separate property does not mean property acquired after coverture, and property acquired after the death of the husband cannot be made liable to satisfy a contra