Jobling J:

The appellant was charged in the Magistrates' Court with three charges of accepting an illegal gratification, contrary to s. 161 of the Penal Code and pleaded guilty to one charge and not guilty to the other two. He was convicted on his plea in respect of one charge and the other two were withdrawn. Appellant has now appealed against his conviction and sentence, and Mr. TE Conaghan has submitted that s. 299 of the Criminal Procedure Code which provides that no appeal shall lie against a conviction after a plea of guilty, is no bar to the appeal in this case.

Mr Conaghan bases his submission on two grounds; first, that the charge discloses no offence known to the law and secondly, that the appellant did not himself plead guilty, his Counsel having pleaded on his behalf.

On the first ground it was contended that neither the charge or the evidence before the Court disclosed that nature of the official act which it was alleged appellant did in consequence of the gratification.

The charge reads as follows:

You are charged that you being a public servant namely a detective in the Police Department, on or about 18 June 1949, at the Court compound, did accept from one Cheong Poh Chin a gratification namely $5 other than legal remuneration, as a motive for showing favour to the said Cheong Poh Chin in the exercise of your official functions, and that you thereby committed an offence punishable under s. 161 of the Penal Code.

And the statement of facts given to the Court was as follows:-

Accused arrested Chong Poo Kit for failing to effect change of address. After bail accused collected money from him for rendering assistance to get him bailed out. Chong reported to Inspector Ritchie.

Appellant, who was represented by Counsel, made no comment on this statement.

It is clear that neither the charge for the statement discloses the nature of the official act alleged to have been done by the appellant and the question is what effect this has on the plea of guilty to a contravention of s. 161 of the Penal Code.

The Municipal Commissioners v. Chauah Seng & Ors 3 Ky 140 was cited by Mr. Conaghan in support of his submission, but it is not altogether on all fours, as in that case evidence was led which showed no offence has been committed. Here the facts stated are too meagre to say for certain whether or not the appellant did do any official act to favour the person from whom he accepted the gratification.

The charge follows the words of the section and is a valid charge and in my view mere uncertainty in the statement of facts does not invalidate the plea of guilty, although it does make it necessary for evidence to be taken to ascertain exactly what facts are alleged.

On the second ground Mr. Conaghan contends that the only acceptable plea is one made by an accused himself and that the plea by Counsel on his behalf cannot be entertained.

In Rex v. Tan Thian Chai & Anor [1932] MLJ 74 , Whitley J agreed with the submission on behalf of appellants that an accused must plead guilty, or claim to be tried, by his own mouth and not through his Counsel, but that was a case where the accused appealed on the ground that their Counsel did not have authority from them to plead guilty.

No such ground of appeal has been put forward in this case, and Mr. Conaghan has not been instructed whether or not the accused authorised the plea of guilty on his behalf. I am asked to hold that an accused must always plead by his own mouth, but I can find nothing to support this contention. Section 182 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not specifically provide for the plea to be made by an accused. It merely lays down that the accused "shall be asked whether he is guilty of the offence charged or claim to be tried" and then goes on in sub-section (b):

(b) If the accused pleads guilty to a charge whether as originally framed or as amended, the plea shall be recorded and he may be convicted thereon; provided that before a plea of guilty is recorded the Court shall as