JUDGMENT

Wilson J:

This was an action for ejectment. In the Memorandum of Appeal it is stated that the summons was served on the defendant on 10 October 1952 for hearing on 16 October Presumably, the date of service was the 10 October 1953. Order 8 r 6 provides that "a summons commencing an action shall be served not less than seven clear days before the return date, unless the Court shall otherwise order" The learned President did not make any order for an earlier trial.

Order 10 r 3 provides that "if a defendant desires to defend the whole or any part of the claim he shall, not less than two days before the return date of the summons, or within such further time as the Court may allow, file and caused to be served on each plaintiff a defence." When the case came on for trial on 16 October 1953 the defendant had not filed any defence but appeared in person. He was asked by the learned President if he admitted the facts set out in the plaint. The defendant said that he did and he was then asked: "Is that why you have not filed a statement of defence?" and he replied, "Yes". The learned President then proceeded to give judgment. It is said that he could not do so because, in the first place, the summons had been served less than seven clear days before the return date. I think it is obvious that it is open to a defendant to waive the provisions of O 8 r 6 if he wishes to do so. It is probable that he was unaware of the provisions at all but I think that, having regard to what happened on 16 October, the defendant must be held to have agreed to the case being tried on that day. In an case he was, on that date, in default by not having filed the defence because, even if the summons had been served upon him seven clear days before the return date, he would on the return date, if it had been seven days after the date of service, have been in default in filing a defence under O 10 r 3. The object of this Rule is for the benefit of the plaintiff so that he may not be taken by surprise at the last moment.

In all the circumstances, I find no merit in the contention that the learned President should have extended the time for the filing of the defence and postpone the hearing of the case. In his grounds of judgment, the learned President states that no defence having been filed, it was open to the Court to give judgment in default under O 10 r 7. I do not think that this rule gave the learned President any such authority. All that r 7 says is that where a party is in default in filing a defence "the Court may direct that such party be precluded from defending the claim." I think, however, there is an inherent power in the Court, where a defendant says he does not wish to file a defence and admits the allegations in the plaint to proceed with the hearing of the case forthwith. There could be no possible reason for adjourning the case or allowing the defendant a further time in which to file a defence.

It has also been argued that, even though the defendant admitted the statements contained in the plaint, it was still incumbent upon the plaintiffs to prove those statements With that proposition I am unable to agree. I do not think it is necessary for a plaintiff to give evidence of any allegation in a statement of claim if that allegation has been admitted by the defendant.

It has further been argued that, although it was admitted that the Rent Assessment Board had issued a certificate under s 13(1)(m) of the Rent Control Ordinance to the effect that the plaintiffs intended to demolish the premises occupied by the defendant for the purpose of re-building and that in the opinion of the Board it was in the public interest they should be permitted to do so, it was necessary for the learned President himself to hear evidence on this point and come to his own conclusion as to whether it was in the public interest or not. In this connection my attention was very properly drawn by Mr Ramani to a decision of Mr Buhagiar J in Kuala Lumpur Civil Suit No