1965 MarsdenLR 5
HIGH COURT (SINGAPORE)
AMBROSE, J
DAMU JADHAO
versus
PARAS NATH SINGH
SUIT NO. 1153 OF 1962
Decided On : 02-19-65
For the plaintiff - NA Christopher; NA Christopher For the defendant - KK Bezboruah; (KK Bezboruah)
Ambrose J:
This action was brought to recover a sum of $2,500 alleged to have been lent by the plaintiff to the defendant and to be payable under an agreement in writing signed by the defendant on 14 June 1962.
One of the defences pleaded was that the written agreement was a promissory note which was inadmissible in evidence, void and unenforceable, because it was not duly stamped. I found that the document was a promissory note within the definition contained in s. 2 of the Stamp Ordinance. According to that definition, " promissory note" includes any document or writing, except a bank note, containing a promise to pay any sum of money. Under s. 4(1) (a) o f the Ordinance the document was chargeable with stamp duty amounting to $1.25 under Articles 13 and 49 of Sch A to the Ordinance. Section 7(2) of the Ordinance required the duty chargeable to be paid and denoted by impressed stamps. The document was stamped with adhesive stamps of the value of 50 cts and not with impressed stamps of the value of $1.25. Under s. 40 of the Ordinance the document had to be stamped before execution as it was executed in Singapore, unless it could be stamped after execution under s. 46 of the Ordinance. Section 46 of the Ordinance provides for stamping of instruments after execution as follows:
Save where other express provision is made by this or any other Ordinance, any unstamped or insufficiently stamped instrument may be stamped after the first execution thereof, subject as follows:
(a) where the instrument, not being a bill of exchange or cheque or promissory note, drawn or made within the Colony, is stamped within fourteen days after it has been first executed in the Colony, or, if first executed out of the Colony within thirty days after it has been first received in the Colony, on payment of the duty only;
(b) when the instrument is stamped within three months after such execution or receipt as aforesaid, on payment in addition to the stamp duty of a penalty of ten dollars or of the amount of deficient duty, whichever penalty is greater;
(c) when the instrument is not stamped within three months after such execution or receipt as aforesaid, on payment in addition to the stamp duty of a penalty of twenty-five dollars or of four times the amount of deficient duty, whichever penalty is greater.
In my opinion, the word " instrument" in paras. (b) and (c) of s. 46 has the same meaning as the word " instrument" in para. (a) and does not include " a bill of exchange or cheque or promissory note drawn or made within the Colony" . This opinion is supported by the view expressed by Huggard CJ in Chop Tiong Kok Hang V. Hock Cheong & Co. [1934]. It seemed to me, therefore, that the document in question could not be stamped after execution under the provisions of s. 46. I accordingly came to the conclusion that the document was not duly stamped under the provisions of the St amp Ordinance referred to above. Section 51 of the Ordinance provides as follows:
No instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence, or shall be acted upon, registered, or authenticated by any such person or by any public officer unless such instrument is duly stamped.
I ruled, therefore, that the document was not admissible in evidence and could not be acted upon by the Court.
Counsel for the defendant submitted that under s. 92 of the Evidence Ordinance no evidence other than the document could be given in proof of the terms of the alleged contract of loan. This section provides as follows:
When the terms of a contract ... have been reduced by or by consent of the parties to the form of a document,... no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, . . . except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions hereinbefore contained.
In my view s. 92