Denys Roberts CJ:

Preliminary The defendant, Jamlong Manmool, faces one charge, as follows -

Commission of an offence against s. 375 of the Penal Code.

That you on the 26 April 1992, at about 9 pm, in the jungle near Simpang 144, Jalan Kiarong, Beribi, Brunei Darussalam, committed rape on Miss X (name given) contrary to s. 375 of the Penal Code.

This charge was read and explained to the defendant, who pleaded not guilty to it.

General

I remind myself that, in a criminal trial, the burden lies upon the prosecution, which must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, every element of a charge which is brought. This burden lies on the prosecution throughout the case and does not change.

The only charge is one of rape, which is defined in s. 375 of the Penal Code (PC) as being committed when a man has sexual intercourse with a woman in one of the five circumstances which are set out in the section. These include sexual intercourse with a woman -

(1) against her will; or

(2) without her consent; or

(3) with her consent when this was obtained by putting her in fear of death or of hurt.

Section 375 P.C., according to the first explanation which is attached to that section, states that it is sufficient to constitute rape if there has been some penetration of the woman by the male organ, whether or not this is followed by an ejaculation inside or outside the woman. The fact of ejaculation is not conclusive. It may be absent in the case of a rape.

Corroboration On a charge of rape, corroboration of the evidence of the complainant is required, and I have to direct myself in the manner prescribed by DPP v. Kilbourne [1973] AC 729. Having warned myself that it is dangerous to act on the evidence of the complainant alone, I may nevertheless do so, if I am satisfied that her evidence is so credible that I am sure of the guilt of the defendant and am prepared to act on the complainant's testimony alone - see also Chiu Nam Hong v. PP [1966] 31 MLJ 40.

Complaints which have been made by a victim in a sexual case do not, in English law, amount to corroboration of her evidence. Under that system, her complaints amount to no more than what is called evidence of "the consistency of her conduct". In Brunei, however, such evidence may amount to corroboration, see PP v. Abd. Rahman & Ors. (criminal trial no. 7 of 1988).

Section 157 of the Evidence Act is in general terms and provides that the evidence of a witness may be corroborated by an earlier statement by that witness at or near to the time when the fact took place. In the Abdul Rahman case, it was decided that evidence of a complaint is admissible as corroboration if the complaint was made as soon as can reasonably be expected after the incident occurs.

The evidence of Suay Jinapa (PW11) is to the effect that Miss X visited the house of Jamlong for dinner on the evening of 26 April 1992. According to Suay, Miss X had visited Jamlong many times before. After dinner, she said that she wanted to go home. Sulvan told her that she would have to wait, so she said she would walk back.

About ten minutes later she came into the room and slapped him and Sulvan, saying that she had been raped by Jamlong. The latter was in the room when she said that he had raped her. I accept this complaint by Miss X as amounting to corroboration of her evidence that she was raped.

The same limitation, however, does not apply to a former statement made by a witness to an "authority legally competent" (which includes a police officer) to investigate the fact. Such a statement is admissible to corroborate the evidence of Miss X.

The complaint made by Miss X to the police, which was reduced to writing, is capable of amounting to corroboration of her evidence, to the extent to which it can be said that the complaint confirms her testimony.

The complaint made by Miss X to the police at 2300 on 27 April about 24 hours after the incident, was that she had been walking home when "a man of Thai nationality whom