JUDGMENTBY: (POYSER, CJ, TERRELL, JA & CUSSEN, J)

was as follows:--

We dismissed this appeal, and at the conclusion of the arguments stated that we would give a written judgment on the points of law raised.

The appellant was convicted on the following charges:--

"First, That you at Kuala Lipis in the State of Pahang on or about 8th

February 1938 being a public servant namely a police officer agreed to

accept from the Pahang Lin Siong Motor Company Ltd., a gratification

other than legal remuneration as a motive for forbearing to do an

official act and thereby committed an offence punishable under section

161 of the Penal Code.

Secondly, That you at Kuala Lipis in the State of Pahang on or about

15th February 1939 being a public servant namely a police officer

accepted from the Pahang Lin Siong Motor Company Ltd., a gratification

other than legal remuneration as a motive for forbearing to do an

official act and thereby committed an offence punishable under section

161 of the Penal Code".

He was sentenced to twelve months simple imprisonment on each charge, the sentences to run concurrently.

There were also two alternative charges, viz:--

"First, That you between February 1st 1938 and August 3rd 1939, being a

public servant agreed to accept for yourself a valuable thing to wit

sums of money amounting to $ 630.00 without consideration from the

Pahang Lin Siong Motor Company Ltd., whom you knew to have been or to

be likely to be concerned in the official functions of yourself as

Officer in Charge of Police District, Lipis, and of the members of the

police force in the said District subordinate to you and thereby

committed an offence under section 165 of the Penal Code".

"Secondly, That you, on or about the 15th February 1939, at Kuala

Lipis, being a public servant namely a police officer (officer in

charge of Police District, Lipis) accepted for yourself a valuable

thing to wit a sum of $ 40.00 without consideration from one S.

Suppiah Managing Director of the Pahang Lin Siong Motor Company Ltd.,

whom you then knew to be likely to be concerned with the official

functions of yourself as such Officer in Charge of Police District,

Lipis, and of the public servants being members of the Police force of

the said District subordinate to you, and that you thereby committed an

offence punishable under section 165 of the Penal Code".

In view of the appellants conviction on the first two charges, the Judge made no finding on these alternative charges.

The following were the appellants main grounds of appeal:--

2. "Charge headed alternatively first is bad in law:

(a) for multiplicity;

(b) for it covers a period exceeding 12 months.

3. The charges are bad in law for uncertainty, in as much as it is

uncertain whether the charges under alternatively are

alternate to the preceding charges respectively, or to the second

charge only, or that the charge headed alternatively first is

an alternative to the preceding charge and that the charge

following is a charge standing alone".

Mr. Salt, on behalf of the appellant, argued that the first alternative charge referred to a transaction distinct from the transaction referred to in the first charge, and was therefore bad, as in effect he was charged that he either did an act on one day at one place or another act, constituting a different offence, on another day at another place.

In support of this argument he cited Sohoni, 13th edition page 584, and further argued that it was not an irregularity but an illegality, and that the conviction must be set aside having regard to the decision in Subramania Iyer v King Emperor 28 Indian Appeals 257 It is quite clear in our opinion that the first alternative charge was alternative to the first ch

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