Rigby J (delivering oral judgment):

This is an appeal by the DPP on the ground that the sentence imposed in this case was inadequate. The respondent was convicted on the charge preferred against him of dangerous driving, and sentenced to three months' imprisonment and a fine of $300, or one month's imprisonment in default of payment of such fine. The learned President further ordered, as, indeed, he was bound to do upon a conviction under s. 35 of the Road Traffic Ordinance, 1958, that the particulars of the conviction should be endorsed upon the respondent's driving licence.

The facts of the case were just about as bad as they could be. It was, in my view, a perfectly appalling case of dangerous driving, to describe the offence at its very lowest. It is sufficient to quote from the facts found by the learned President in his grounds of decision. The facts were that the accused, a young man, aged 24, was driving a motor lorry along Lahar Yooi/Jarak Main Road towards Ara Kudah, Province Wellesley. The accused's lorry was following behind another lorry. At about the 11 mile Jarak Road the accused attempted to overtake the lorry in front. As the accused's lorry drew level with the other lorry and was about to overtake it the accused's lorry smashed into two Malay cyclists who were cycling on their correct side of the road in single file from the opposite direction. The two cyclists were thrown into the ditch on their side of the road. Both of them suffered very severe injuries and were killed instantaneously. Photographs were produced in evidence at the trial, and they show the appalling injuries that were sustained by the two unfortunate cyclists. The facts show quite clearly that the respondent attempted to overtake another lorry and in doing so literally ploughed into the two cyclists coming from the opposite direction and riding in single file. It would be difficult to find a worse case of dangerous driving. The sentence, in my view, on those facts, was a lenient one. But I do not propose to interfere with it. I am, however, very much more concerned with the omission of the learned President, in what he considered to be a proper exercise of his discretion, not to impose a period of disqualification in respect of the respondent's driving license. Section 35(3) of the Road Traffic Ordinance, which the Learned President has cited in his grounds of decision, is perfectly clear. It provides that:

On a second or subsequent conviction under this section the Court shall exercise the power conferred by this Part of this Ordinance of ordering that the offender shall be disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence unless the Court, having regard to the lapse of time since the date of the previous or last previous conviction or for any other reason (which reason shall be stated in the order). Thinks fit to order otherwise but this provision shall not be construed as affecting the right of the Court to exercise the power aforesaid on a first conviction.

The learned President, therefore, held, perfectly properly, that it was a matter for his discretion as to whether or not he should impose a period of disqualification on the respondent in respect of this conviction, which was, of course, the respondent's first conviction for an offence of this nature. The learned President then stated:-

I think the sentence I have imposed is quite adequate and in exercising my discretion I declined to impose a disqualification.

The learned President has not stated in his grounds of decision the reasons why in this particular case, he has not thought fit to impose any disqualification other than to say that the sentence that he imposed was, in his view, adequate. It is, therefore, impossible to find out what other considerations, if any other than the matter of sentence - influenced him in not imposing a disqualification. With respect to the learned President, in my view, his failure to impose any disqualification in this case was n