Neal J:

In the Court below the following judgment was delivered:

The appellant gave notice of appeal on 12 October 1960, against the whole of the decision of the learned president of the sessions Court Ipoh given on the 7 October 1960, wherein the president exercising his discretionary power vested in him under O. 36 r. 7 and O. 10 r. 7 refused an application by the appellant in the following terms:

I therefore pray for an order for extension of time to serve the statement of defence on the plaintiff or his solicitor.

and directed pursuant to O. 10 r. 7 of the Subordinate Courts RuleS that the appellant be precluded from defending the claim. Pursuant to this the president entered according to the record what I can only describe as a judgment by default against the appellant.

In his memorandum of appeal pursuant to the notice of appeal to which I have referred the appellant limits his grounds of appeal in the following terms:

... that is to say the appellant submits with respect that having regard to the circumstances of the case, and, in particular, the fact that, although out of time, the appellant did file a statement of defence which, the appellant submits, discloses a prima facie defence; the fact that such statement of defence was before the Court at the time the order precluding the appellant from defending was made; the fact that such statement of defence was filed in Court nine days before the date fixed for the hearing of the case; the fact that the appellant had paid into Court the sum of $1,832.70 the amount claimed by the respondent; the fact that such sum was in Court when the order precluding the appellant from defending was made; and having regard to the inherent powers of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary to prevent injustice or to prevent abuse

of the process of the Court the learned resident ought to have looked into the defence and ought to have heard the action and given judgment on the merits.

Before me, in addition, Counsel made it clear that he was not attacking the refusal of the Court below to extend time. Nevertheless it forms part of the decision of the Court below and since it appears doubtful whether it can properly be abandoned before me I propose to deal with it. The facts are perfectly clear and not in dispute. The appellant who is represented by Counsel (not the Counsel appearing before me) applied for on 5 August 1960 and obtained leave to file his statement of defence within two weeks. During the period intervening the plaintiff obtained leave to issue execution before judgment and the appellant deposited the amount of the alleged indebtedness in Court. On the 7 October the appellant not having filed his statement of defence within the period fixed by the Court made the application to which I have referred, obviously intended to be a further extension of time for filing his defence. He put forward by way of excuse that a solicitor not engaged by either of the parties in connection with his suit had stated to the appellant that the plaintiff had expressed his willingness to arrive at an amicable settlement of all his dealings with the appellant. In my opinion, the president was right in refusing to grant a further extension of time. Counsel, however, argued before me on the lines set out in his grounds of appeal. He relied upon the English authorities based upon the English Supreme Court Rules before their amendment. For myself, I find it unnecessary to deal with the question of the applicability of those rules since there is little similarity between the provisions of the Subordinate Courts Rules in the Federation and the original Supreme Court Rules in the United Kingdom. In my opinion the position is governed by O. 19 r. 3. I might add at this stage that this rule was not argued before me. The senior assistant Registrar has drawn attention of Counsel on both sides to its existence and to my view that it governs this particular appeal. Inspite of the invitatio