Rigby J:

In this action the plaintiff claims:

(1)a declaration that the lease dated 27 June 1958, in respect of the Bee Lean Cinema Theatre at Bedong, and made between the first two defendants as the lessors, of the one part, and himself and his then partner, of the other part, is valid and of full force for a further period of two years from 1 July 1960, to 30 June 1962;

(2)an injunction to restrain the defendants, their servants or agents, from interfering with his peaceful possession of the cinema theatre;

(3)an order for the return of certain specified parts of cinematographic apparatus, more particularly described in the Writ of Summons and the Statement of Claim, wrongfully removed by the first defendant from the cinema theatre on 1 September 1960;

(4)damages and any further or other relief.

The facts giving rise to the claim are briefly as follows. By an agreement dated 27 June 1958 the plaintiff and his then partner agreed to take a lease from the first and second defendants (to whom I will hereafter refer as "the defendants" in contradistinction to "the third and fourth defendants") of "the Bee Lean Cinema together with its building equipments and projectors, telephones and electricity and other apparatus as per list" for a period of two years from 1 July 1958, at a monthly rental of $325. The agreement contained a clause providing that "at the end of two years' agreement period if the lessees think fit that they could carry out a further one or two years more than the lessors have the right to keep back the deposit till the termination of the period".

It further contained the usual clause that in the event of any dispute arising between the parties the matter should be submitted to arbitration.

Due to curfew restrictions and other unforeseen circumstances in connection with the Emergency, business was bad with the result that in December 1959 the plaintiff's partner retired from the business leaving the plaintiff to carry on on his own. With the subsequent relaxation of the Emergency restrictions culminating in the termination of the Emergency itself business improved. In May 1960 the plaintiff according to his evidence, gave verbal notice to the defendants of his intention to exercise his option of renewing the lease. The defendants deny that any such notice was given to them. I have no hesitation in accepting the evidence of the plaintiff, in preference to that of the defendants, that he did, in fact, give such notice. I am fortified in that view by the fact that on 15 May, the defendants' solicitors wrote to the plaintiff informing him that certain specified items of stock required repair or replacing and stating that if they were not attended to before the end of May "my clients will refuse to renew the said lease".

By a somewhat belated letter dated 16 June the plaintiff himself replied to the defendants' solicitors' letter and stated that some of the articles had been sent back for repairing and the defendants would be advised in due course.

On 20 June the defendants, through their solicitors, replied to that letter stating that since the plaintiff could not comply with their requests stated in their letter of 15 May, they did not intend to renew the lease and required the plaintiff to quit and deliver up possession of the cinema before 1 July 1960, when his lease would have expired.

Thereafter the plaintiff, according to his evidence, which I accept and believe, again approached the defendants for a renewal of the lease. According to his evidence, which I accept, the defendants demanded that the rent be increased from $325 to $400 as a condition precedent to renewing the lease. The plaintiff did not agree to any such increase.

On 30 June the day the original lease expired, the defendants instead of renewing the lease, caused a notice dated 30 June to be served by their new solicitors upon the plaintiff informing him that the lease had not been renewed and requiring him that very day to give