Gill FJ:

The question for determination in this appeal was whether a company incorporated and registered under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1965 is a "statutory authority" as defined in s. 27(3) of the Trade Unions Ordinance, 1959, which was added by reg. 9 of the Essential (Trade Unions) Regulations, 1969 as enacted by PU (A) 408 of 1969 on 9 October 1969.

The question arose in this way. As a result of certain claims being made by the respondent union for revision of the terms of service of the employees of the appellant company, there arose a dispute which could not be resolved by the parties. It was therefore referred on the joint request of the parties to the Minister who in turn referred it to the Industrial Court under s. 23 of the Industrial Relations Act, 1967.

The respondent union filed its statement of case on 24 February 1969 and the appellant company its reply on 10 April 1969. The case came up for hearing before the Industrial Court on 7 October 1969 but was adjourned for further negotiations between the parties on a certain agreed basis, so that even if there was no complete settlement the points of difference might be narrowed.

As no settlement was arrived at, even though the differences between the parties were ascertained, the case came up for hearing before the Industrial Court on 1 December 1969. At the commencement of the hearing Counsel for the appellant company submitted that, as the appellant company was a statutory authority as defined in s. 27(3) of the Trade Unions Ordinance, 1959, and since under sub-ss. 3(a) and 3(b) of that section the employees of the company were prohibited from becoming members of a trade union which was not confined exclusively to persons employed by it and since any such trade union could not be affiliated to any other trade union or federation of trade unions whose membership was not otherwise so confined, the respondent union had no locus standi in the case. The Industrial Court rejected such submission but agreed to an adjournment to enable the company to apply to the High Court for an interpretation of the relevant law.

The matter was brought before the High Court by way of originating summons the hearing of which took place in open Court on 21 April 1970. The questions upon which ruling of the High Court was sought were as follows:

(a) Do the words "statutory authority" include a company constituted under the Companies Act, 1965 for the purposes of s. 27(3) of the Trade Unions Ordinance.

(b)If so have the employees of the Kuala Lumpur, Klang & Port Swettenham Omnibus Co. Bhd. ceased to be employees of the respondent union.

(c)If they have ceased to be members -

(i) Can the respondent union represent the said employees at the Industrial Court so as cause them to be bound by any decision of the Industrial Court; and

(ii)Is the reference by the Minister rendered void by virtue of the fact that the respondent no longer represents the workmen; and

(d)In the circumstances should the Industrial Court proceed with the hearing of the case before it?

It will be convenient to set out the entire provisions of s. 27 of the Ordinance. It reads as follows:

27 (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of this section, no public officer shall join or be a member of any trade union or shall be accepted as a member of any trade union.

(2)The Yang di-Pertuan Agong may by notification in the Gazette exempt from the provisions of sub-section (1) either wholly or subject to such conditions as are in such notification specified any public officers or any category, class or description of public officers and thereupon such public officers shall be deemed to be workmen for the purpose of this Ordinance.

(3)

(a) No person employed by a statutory authority shall join or be a member of, or be accepted as a member by any trade union unless the membership of that trade union is confined exclusively to persons employed by the particular statutory authority.

(b)Any