Gopal Sri Ram JCA:

[1] There are three appeals before us. They all arise from a Mareva or freezing injunction granted by the High Court. One is directed against the grant of the order ex parte; the other is against the dismissal of the defendants' application to set aside the injunction; the third is against the refusal of the judge to vary the terms of the injunction. By consent the parties agreed to go forward on the appeal directed against the grant of the assets-freezing injunction. But let me first say a few words about the factual matrix against which these appeals lie.

[2] The plaintiff (respondent before us) is a South African company. It is in liquidation. Its liquidator has brought this action in its name for the recovery of certain shares worth several million ringgit which belong to it. The crux of the plaintiff's claim is that the shares were moved out of the plaintiff's hands and into the hands of the first defendant (first appellant before us) by one Dato' Samsudin bin Abu Hassan, the second defendant (the second appellant before us) who at all material times stood in a fiduciary position vis a vis the plaintiff. There is also an assertion that the first defendant is the alter ego of the second defendant. The method or process invoked by the plaintiff is the equitable right in the beneficial owner of property to trace that property into the hands of a third party. The primary remedy that has been sought is a declaration. The plaintiff became afraid that the first defendant would dissipate its assets it owns across the globe to frustrate any judgment that may be obtained. So, it moved ex parte for an injunction freezing the defendant's assets worldwide. The judge who heard the plaintiff's summons granted the order. Later, he refused to set aside that order or to vary it.

[3] The learned judge did not, however, produce any written reasons for his decision. This greatly hampered our task. For, as an appellate court in a matter such as this which involves the exercise of discretion our initial function is one of review only. We do not possess any original discretion. It is not our function to undertake a study of all the affidavits and exhibits filed in the court below to arrive at a conclusion as to how each of us in this court would have exercised the discretion and then to see if our view matches that of the judge at first instance.

[4] The law on the point is clear and beyond argument. It is for an appellant to demonstrate that the High Court - the repository of the original discretion - did not exercise it in accordance with law. That is to say, that it did not take into account relevant considerations or took into account irrelevant considerations or asked itself the wrong question or misinterpreted a provision of written law. Further, even if the precise nature of the error is not discoverable, it is sufficient for an appellant to demonstrate that the result arrived at by the judge is so unreasonable or plainly unjust so that we may infer that there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion. See, House v. The King [1936] 55 CLR 499 at 504-505; Lovell v. Lovell [1950] 81 CLR 573 at 532-534; Rodgers v. Rodgers [1964] 114 CLR 608 at 619-620; Dinsdale v. R [2000] 202 CLR 321. Lastly, even if an appellant is unable to bring home any of the foregoing matters, we are nevertheless under a duty to review the order made and to intervene if we are satisfied that there has been an injustice to one of the parties as a result of the judge's exercise of discretion. See, Maxwell v. Keun [1928] 1 KB 645 at 653; Walker v. Walker [1967] 1 WLR 327 at 330; Collier-Garland (Properties) Pty Ltd v. Northern Transport Co Pty Ltd [1964] 82 (NSW) WN (Pt 1) 125 at 127; Bloch v. Bloch [1981] 37 ALR 55 at 58-59.

[5] For completeness I refer to Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Federation Ltd. v. Sunder Bros AIR [1967] SC 249 where Ramaswami J when delivering the judgment of the Indian Supreme Court said:

In dealing with the