Heliliah Mohd Yusof J:

The appellant was convicted of an offence under para. (a) of s. 11 of the Anti Corruption Act 1997 (1997 Act). There were several grounds of appeal but these grounds all appear to have stemmed from the way in which certain issues have been addressed by the learned Sessions Court Judge. The mainstay of the arguments of the appellant was that there were misdirections particularly on the standard of proof in relation to the application of s. 42(1) of the 1997 Act that is a statutory presumption. With regard to the grounds of judgment I observe that it is true that generally the grounds of judgment have not disclosed how certain findings had been arrived at and even then no authorities were cited. However it is also noted that there were facts relevant to the issues that were referred to by the learned judge. I therefore propose to deal with the grounds of judgment under specific headings and they are as follows:

(a) The presumption under s. 42(1) of the Act 1997.

(b) The evidence of witnesses.

(c) The defence.

The Presumption

Under this heading the decision in PP v. Yuvaraj [1969] 2 MLJ 89 is relevant since in that case what was under cons deration were ss. 4(a) and 14(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1961 (the 1961 Act). Section 11(a) of the 1997 Act is in pari materiawith s. 4(2) of the 1961 Act while s. 42(1) of the 1997 Act is in similar terms with s. 14 of the 1961 Act. Lord Diplock in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council observed:

Where a defendant is charged with an offence under section 4(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1961, to which section 14 also applied, the onus lies upon the prosecution to prove the first two factual ingredients of the offence viz.(1) that a gratification was paid or given to or received by the defendant and (2) that at the time of the payment, gift or receipt he was in the employment of a public body. Upon proof of these two ingredients the existence of the third ingredient, viz.(3) that the gratification was paid or given or received corruptly as an inducement or reward for doing or forbearing to do an act in relation to the affairs of that public body, is to be presumed "unless the contrary is proved."

This appeal turns solely upon the construction of these words "unless the contrary is proved."

The third ingredient which is to be presumed to exist unless the contrary is proved is a "fact" within the definition of that word in the Evidence Ordinance. That Ordinance provides in section 2 that it "shall apply to all judicial proceedings in or before any court" with certain exceptions which are not material to the present case."

In the present appeal the prosecution sought to establish that the appellant at the material time, is an officer in the employment of a public office and that as an agent within the meaning of the 1997 Act has accepted or obtained a gratification since the meaning of gratification includes "money". According to the Record of Appeal at the end of the case for the prosecution the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor in the course of his submission referred to PP v. Yuvaraj, supra,and did state that at that stage of the proceedings the burden of proof on the prosecution was to establish a prima faciecase. Having referred to PP v. Yuvarajthe Deputy Public Prosecutor also referred to Attan Abdul GHani v. PP [1970] 2 MLJ 143 where he cited excerpts from the judgment of Sharma J (as he then was) the relevant passage of which is as follows:

Once it is proved that the gratification has been paid or received then in the words of section 14 of the Act "Such gratification shall be deemed to have been paid or given or received corruptly ..." The presumption at once arises under the section. This presumption is a presumption of law and it is obligatory on the court to raise it in every proceeding for an offence under section 3 or 4 of the Act provided it is proved that the gratification had been paid, given or received. The prosecution has