Abdul Hamid Mohamad FCJ:

[1] The appellant was arrested on 17 April 2002 under s 73(1) of the Internal Security Act 1960 ("ISA").

[2] On 9 May 2002, an originating motion was filed by her mother praying for the following orders:

1. That access be given to her counsel to take instruction from her pursuant to art 5(3) of the Federal Constitution and, for that purpose, the appellant be brought to court.

2. Further and in the alternative that the appellant be produced in court and to be released.

3. Further and after the appellant is released, that she will not be arrested and/or detained again.

4. Other orders and/or direction that the court deems fit to make.

[3] The application was heard on 4, 7 and 12 June 2002. During that period the appellant was still under detention pursuant to s 73(3) of the ISA.

[4] On 12 June 2002, the High court fixed the case for its decision on 14 June 2002.

[5] On the same date (12 June 2002) the Minister in exercise of the powers given to him by s 8(5) of the ISA issued a restriction order on the appellant.

[6] On 14 June 2002, just before the learned judge delivered her decision, learned counsel for the respondents informed her of the fact that the appellant had been placed under a restriction order issued on 12 June 2002. The learned judge dismissed the application. The appellant appealed to this court.

[7] The judgment is in two parts. In the first part the learned judge dealt with the issue that the application for habeas corpus was no longer maintainable as the appellant was no longer under detention. She dismissed the application on that ground.

[8] In the second part, in case she was wrong in so holding, she dealt with the grounds of the application and, finding that they were without merits, held that the application should be dismissed too.

[9] We decided to hear the argument on the first issue first ie, whether the appeal was maintainable in view of the fact that the appellant was no longer under detention.

[10] Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the appeal was maintainable. He argued that the relevant and material date to be considered for the purpose of deciding the legality of an order of detention in a habeas corpus application was the date when the application was heard. As in this case, on the dates the application was heard, the appellant was still under detention (under s 73) the High court had the jurisdiction to entertain and decide on the application, even though on the date of the decision, the appellant was no longer under detention. While admitting that the law was not settled, he submitted that there was no authority which supported the proposition that the relevant date was the date of the decision of the application. He distinguished the case of Cheow Siong Chin v. Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors, [1985] 2 MLJ 95; [1985] CLJ (Rep) 59 on the ground that, in that case, the application for the issue of the writ of habeas corpus was filed after the restriction order had been issued and served. He also distinguished Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors v. Nasharuddin Nasir; [2004] 1 CLJ 81 FC; [2003] 6 AMR 497 on the ground that in that case the application for the issue of the writ of habeas corpus was filed prior to the issue of the detention order under s 8, the application was heard and the decision was given after the issue of the detention order.

[11] In the alternative, learned counsel argued that this court should proceed to hear the appeal on all the grounds raised in the petition of appeal because there were important questions for the determination of this court. The questions, according to him are:

(a) which affect the personal liberty of a person;

(b) which revolve around points of constitutional law;

(c) which requires a scrutiny of the constitutionality and legality of s 73(1)(b) ISA;

(d) which requires a scrutiny of the application of the ISA in respect of the Appellant;

(e) which requires an interpretation of this court's decision in Ezam (on the objective and subjective test a