1979 MarsdenLR 203
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR)
MOHAMED AZMI, J
RE APPLICATION BY DUNLOP ESTATES BHD; DUNLOP ESTATES BHD
versus
ALL MALAYAN ESTATES STAFF UNION
ORIGINATING MOTION NO. 59 OF 1978
Decided On : 05-22-79
For the applicants - ATC Saw; M/s. Ng Yook Woon, Andrew TC Saw & Zahardin For the respondents - D.P. Xavier; M/s. Xavier & Vadiveloo
Mobamed Azmi J:
This is an application by notice of originating motion for an order of certiorari to remove to this Court for the purpose of its being quashed the Award No. 26/78 handed down on 10 March 1978 by the Industrial Court in Case No. 228/76. The dispute before the Industrial Court is over the claim of Mr. Soon Siak Fooi, a Hospital Assistant employed by Dunlop Estates Berhad (the applicants), with effect from 1 October 1970. It is the contention of the respondent union, of which Mr. Soon is a member, that although Mr. Soon, the claimant, has been recruited as a Grade I Hospital Assistant and has been performing the duties of a Hospital Assistant of that grade, he is not paid the salary of a Grade I officer as provided by the 1971 MAPA/AMESU Collective Agreement. In short, although appointed as a Grade I Hospital Assistant, he was paid a salary equivalent to Grade II Hospital Assistant. However, Dunlop Estates Berhad, the applicants, maintained that Mr. Soon has been recruited as a Grade II Hospital Assistant, and therefore, is not entitled to a Grade I salary and allowance. It is not seriously disputed that Mr. Soon first took up the matter of grading with the applicants on 27 April 1974. As there was no response, his union, the present respondents, took up the matter with the applicants on 20 May 1976. Eventually, the dispute was referred to the Industrial Court by the Minister of Labour and Manpower under .s. 26(2) of the Industrial Relations Act, 1967 on 8 November 1976. By its award handed down on 10 March 1978. the Industrial Court found on the evidence that Mr. Soon was in effect employed as a Grade I Hospital Assistant from the date of his recruitment (i.e. 1 October 1970), and ordered the applicants to pay him the difference between what he should have been paid and what he actually received since 1 October 1970 in basic salary and other allowances, if any.
Before me, the issue has somewhat been narrowed down substantially. The order of the Industrial Court which the applicants wish to quash is only that part which made the order retrospective more than six months from 8 November 1976 on the round that it is contrary to the provision of s. 30(7) of the Industrial Relations Act, 1967. It is argued that there is an error of law on the face of the record as far as this part of the order is concerned, and, further, it is in excess of jurisdiction. It is common ground that the High Court has power to quash part of the Industrial Court Order if that part can be severed. In the present case, there are two limbs to the order and they are severable from one another. If the invalid part of an order is distinct and severable from the remainder, certiorari may issue to quash that part only. Before me, the applicants accept the order of the Industrial Court that Mr. Soon should be emplaced in Grade I and be paid the salary of an officer of that grade, but the order should not be made retrospective from 1 October 1970 when Mr. Soon was first recruited. According to them, it should be effective either from 8 May 1976 i.e. six months from date of reference to Court by reason of s. 30(7), or 20 May 1976 i.e. the date when the union first took up the matter by virtue of s. 30(5). By the proviso to s. 30(7), the retrospective date of the award should not be made earlier than six months from 8 November 1976 i.e. the date on which the dispute was referred to the Court by the Minister.
Section 30(7) provides:
An award may specify the period during which it shall continue in force, and may be retrospective to such date as is specified in the award:
Provided that the retrospective date of the award may not, except in the case of a decision of the Court under s. 33 or an order of the Court under s. 56(2)(c) or a decision of the Court on a reference to it under s. 20(3), be earlier than six months from the date on which the dispute was referred to the Court.
On the interpretation of the above provision, it is argued on b