Eusoffe Abdoolcader J:

This appeal involves the question of the validity of the compulsory acquisition for a public purpose of some 5 acres of land comprised in Lot 5 section 42 in the Town of Kuala Lumpur held under Grant No. 6444 and vested in the first appellant as the sole surviving trustee for and on behalf of the second appellant (`the association'), a society registered under the Societies Act 1966, pursuant to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act 1960, (`the Act') for the construction of a hockey stadium for the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports. The land in question according to the first of the special conditions of title in the grant is to be used solely for the erection of a building or buildings and for a recreation ground for the purposes of the Association but on the affidavit evidence it appears that various public sporting events have also been held there. To avoid repetition and as we are primarily concerned with the Act, all references to statutory provisions in this judgment will be to the Act unless otherwise specifically indicated.

The brief facts of the matter are that the Land Executive Committee of the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, acting under the powers delegated to it by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, had decided on 24 April 1981, on the compulsory acquisition of the land in question for the purpose we have referred to and initiated the requisite process in implementation thereof. The first respondent accordingly caused to be published in the Federal Government Gazetteof 21 May 1981, the necessary declaration in Form D under s. 8 and this was followed by the other consequential statutory notices and a certificate of urgency with regard to possession. There was however failure to comply with the provisions of s. 9(1)(b)regarding notation but as soon as this was discovered the omission was rectified and the necessary notation of the intended acquisition made on the register document of title on 28 July 1981.

The appellants took out a summons on 24 July 1981, to impugn the validity of the acquisition and claimed a series of declarations on several grounds to this effect but Hashim Yeop A. Sani J, in a reserved judgment delivered on 11 September 1981 refused all the declarations sought. The appellants then appealed to us against this order but abandoned some of the grounds previously relied on and the appeal was argued on four grounds, namely:

(1) that there is a right of a pre-acquisition hearing under the Act in consonance with the rules of natural justice;

(2) in the alternative, that Article 13(1) of the Federal Constitution would render any law providing for deprivation of property without a hearing, invalid;

(3) that the question of public purpose is justiciable and the present user of the land already constitutes use for a public purpose and so negates any requirement for compulsory acquisition and that the purported acquisition of the land under s. 3 wouldamount to deprivation of property which is confiscatory in nature;

(4) that the failure to comply with the provisions of s. 9(1)(b)which are mandatory and not directory vitiated the acquisition purported to have been effected.

Before proceeding to consider the four issues reaised we should perhaps make some observation on two matters which have neither been raised nor considered at any stage of these proceedings hitherto. First, the Association as such has no standing and is incompetent to sue as a plaintiff. It is a body registered under the Societies Act and s. 9(c) thereof specificially provides that a society may sue in the name of its registered public officer. If there is no member registered as such, but we have not been told that is so, then we would think that if it was at all necessary for the Association to sue jointly as a plaintiff a representative claim by one or more of its office-bearers on behalf of all the members would be the soulution. In any event the comptent person to sue in this matter if the first ap