(delivering the judgment of the Court): The appellant, a trainee conductor employed by the respondent company, was dismissed with effect from March 20, 1975. He made representations to the Minister of Labour and Manpower under section 16A of the Industrial Relations Act, No. 35 of 1967. The Minister set in motion the machinery under the section, and as no settlement was reached, on August 29, 1975, referred the matter to the Industrial Court, under subsection (9) of the section.

Section 16A provides as follows:

"(1) Where a workman considers that he has been dismissed without just cause or excuse by his employer, … he may, within one month of such dismissal, make representations in writing to the Minister to be reinstated in his former employment.

(2)The Minister may, before making a decision on any such representations, request the Commissioner to enquire into the dismissal and report whether in his opinion the dismissal is without just cause or excuse, and in such an enquiry the workman may be represented by his trade union.

(9) Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing subsections, the Minister may of his own motion if he is satisfied that it is expedient so to do or on the joint request of the trade union representing the workman and his employer or his trade union refer any dismissal to the [Industrial] Court for settlement."

In due course the Industrial Court directed that the appellant he reinstated with effect from November 1, 1977.

The company did not reinstate him, and so he complained to the Industrial Court of the non-compliance under section 56 of the Act. On March 11, 1978 the Industrial Court heard the complaint and again directed reinstatement. And on the same day the company applied for leave for an order of certiorari in the High Court to quash the award of the Industrial Court. Leave was granted and the substantive motion was heard by Vohrah J. on April 5, 1979. Then for the first time the company raised a preliminary point — the point being that since section 16A had been repealed by the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 1975, Act A299/75, effective from August 1, 1975, (see P.U.(B) 292 of July 17, 1975), it was no longer effective on August 29, 1975, the date the matter was referred by the Minister to the Industrial Court; and that it not being disputed that the Industrial Court was clothed with jurisdiction if and only if there had been a proper reference to it by the Minister, the Industrial Court therefore had no jurisdiction to determine this dispute, and it followed that the award purporting to reinstate the appellant was null and void. The learned judge agreed and upheld the preliminary objection. It is against that decision that this appeal has been brought.

The sole issue here is, did the Industrial Court have jurisdiction to determine this dispute?

The company contends that the court did not, because the letter written on behalf of the Minister to the court mentioned section 16A as the authority under which he made the reference, a provision which was then no longer in existence — a contention with which, as we have seen, the learned judge agreed. The appellant on the other hand contends that the real question is not whether or not the Minister had authority to refer the dispute to the Industrial Court under section 16A, but whether or not at the material time he had authority under the law to make the reference.

With respect we agree with the appellant's contention as to the real issue, and with his further submission that the Minister did have authority to make the reference under section 23(1) and (2) of the Act (now section 26(1) and (2) of the Revised Act).

It is now necessary to reproduce that section and the letter on behalf of the Minister referring this dispute to the Industrial Court.

The section reads:

"(1) Where a trade dispute exists … the Minister may, if that dispute is not otherwise resolved, refer the dispute to the court on the joint request in writing to