Chan Sek Keong J:

This is an appeal by the plaintiff against the decision of Grimberg JC dismissing the plaintiff's claim to an easement of right of way over the defendant's part of a common driveway running on both sides of the boundary between two houses, viz., No. 67 Trevose Crescent, which belongs to the plaintiff and No. 69 Trevose Crescent, which belongs to the defendant.

In this judgment, the expression "the defendant's driveway" will be used to mean that portion of the common driveway situated on the defendant's land, and the expression "the plaintiff's driveway" will be used with the corresponding meaning. The plaintiff's driveway is 2.74 metres wide at the end of Trevose Crescent and 3.95 metres wide about half-way up the driveway, and the defendant's driveway is 2.73 metres wide at the end of Trevose Crescent and 3.5 metres wide at about half-way up the driveway. Since 1957, the common driveway has been used by both the plaintiff and the defendant for access by means of motor cars to the parking lots situated at the back of both the houses.

The said houses and the other houses in the same area were developed in the 1950s by M/s Ideal Homes as part of two housing estates known as Dunearn Park and Whitley Park. No. 69 was conveyed by a conveyance dated 20 June 1956 by Hongkong & Shanghai Bank (Malaya) Trustee Ltd as the vendor and the developers as the original purchasers to the plaintiff as the sub-purchaser. No. 67 was conveyed in the same manner to the plaintiff's predecessor in title by a conveyance dated 24 April 1957. In this judgment, the expression "the No. 69 Conveyance" will be used to refer to the conveyance dated 20 June 1956 and the expression "the No. 67 Conveyance" will be used to refer to the conveyance dated 2 April 1957.

His Honour dismissed the plaintiff's action on three grounds: (1) that the express reservation of easements in the No. 69 Conveyance did not include a right of way over the defendant's driveway; (2) that the plaintiff could not claim a right of way by way of necessity as the plaintiff's driveway provided vehicular access to his parking lot; (3) that there was no common intention between the developers and the defendant that the defendant's driveway be used by the developers and those deriving title from them for access by motor car to and from the parking lot at No. 67.

Before us, Counsel for the plaintiff abandoned the ground of necessity and confined his case to express reservation and implied reservation arising from a common intention.

Was There An Express Reservation of a Right of Way Over Defendant's Driveway?

The terms of the No. 69 Conveyance was as follows:

... convey ... All the land and premises described in the First Schedule hereto Together with full and free right and liberty for the [defendant] ... in common with the [developers] and all persons having the like right and liberty with or without horses ... carriages, motor cars and other vehicles of every description at all times and for all purposes whatsoever connected with the use and enjoyment of the said land and premises hereby conveyed to pass and re-pass along over and upon the roads built or to be built by the [developers] in or upon the said Estates and providing access to the said land and premises hereby conveyed ... Reserving nevertheless to the Original Purchasers and to all others to whom the Original Purchasers may grant or have already granted the same similar rights of way along over and upon the said roads and similar rights of drainage and the right to make connections as aforesaid and to construct and use any drains pipes and cable over or under the said land hereby conveyed as the Original Purchasers may consider necessary for the purpose of serving other adjoining and adjacent houses on the said Estates and to make all necessary connections thereto TO HOLD the same unto the Sub-Purchaser in fee simple.

The questions for determination was whether the word of reservation in the No. 69 Conve