The appellant was charged on February 18, 1982 in the Sessions Court at Johore Bahru as follows: —

"That you on January 8 1976, at the Post Office, Scudai, in the District of Johore Bahru, in the State of Johore, being a Public Servant, to wit, the Postmaster of the said Post Office, and in such capacity were entrusted with $200.00 cash belonging to the Government of Malaysia, being money deposited with the Post Office Savings Bank Malaysia, vide Post Office Savings Account No. Scudai 1954 committed criminal breach of trust of the said property, and that you have thereby committed an offence punishable under section 409 of the Penal Code."

He was represented by counsel. After the charge was read and explained and understood the appellant pleaded guilty.

The Prosecuting Officer then gave the court a short summary of the facts.

I do not propose to set out that summary in full in this judgment. Suffice it to say that after setting out the background the Prosecuting Officer added that the accused had received the sum of $200/- from the complainant, had made the relevant entry into the complainant's savings bank book, but had not made a corresponding entry into the register containing all the takings for the day which it was the appellant's duty to keep and maintain. In response to an audit query two weeks later by headquarters the appellant could not account for the missing $200/-.

These facts were admitted by the accused. He was then convicted and counsel made a lengthy plea for mitigation but nowhere in this plea is there any attempt to explain what might have become of the missing $200/-.

Section 409 of the Penal Code carries a mandatory sentence of imprisonment which may extend to 20 years and it also provides for liability to a fine.

It is obvious from the record that the learned President gave very careful consideration to the plea in mitigation and on February 18, 1982 she stated that in view of the mitigating factors in the matter she was sentencing the appellant to 18 months' imprisonment. She granted a stay of execution pending appeal.

Thereafter on February 18, 1982 the appellant gave formal notice of appeal followed by a petition of appeal on May 21, 1983 in which the petitioner stated himself to be dissatisfied with the conviction, decision and sentence of the learned President and appealed against the whole of her decision on various grounds.

In summary these grounds were directed to two issues namely that the facts disclosed in the plea of mitigation went towards negativing the offence to which the appellant had pleaded guilty and that the sentence imposed by similar courts in respect of similar offences.

It was strenuously urged by counsel for the appellant in this appeal that even though section 305 of the Criminal Procedure Code provided that

"When an accused person has pleaded guilty and been convicted by a magistrate on such a plea there shall be no appeal except as to the extent or legality of the sentence."

nevertheless this court should in the exercise of its discretion under section 325 of the Code reverse the plea of guilty and remit the case for a re-trial.

In support of this proposition counsel for the appellant cited Heng Kim Khoon v Public Prosecutor [1972] 1 MLJ 30. The accused was not represented in the court of first instance. He admitted the facts but what he stated in mitigation clearly showed that his explanation amounted to a denial of guilt and the Appellate Court therefore in the exercise of its discretion allowed the appeal and sent the case back for re-trial.

Counsel for the appellant also referred to Chen Chong & Ors v Public Prosecutor [1967] 2 MLJ 130. He relied upon this case to support his contention that under section 173(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code there was a duty cast upon the prosecution to ensure that, when setting out the facts after a plea of guilt, the narrative was a complete legalistic catalogue of every necessary ingredient which constituted the offence. If a