The respondent operated a hotel called Abad Century Hotel at No. 32-34, 2 1/2 mile, Jalan Kelang, Kuala Lumpur until it was closed down on 30 August 1981. On 6 September 1980 the respondent entered into a tenancy agreement in writing with the appellant whereby the respondent sublet the third floor of the hotel containing seventeen rooms (hereinafter called the demised premises) to the appellant for a period of three years with effect from 1 November 1980 at a monthly rent of RM12,000 and a further agreed payment of RM2,000 per month for water and electricity supplied to and consumed in the demised premises. The appellant duly went into possession and operated a recreation or health centre in the demised premises in accordance with the term of the tenancy agreement. This the appellant continued to do so until 7 August 1981 when the security guards engaged by the respondent prevented the appellant and his partner from gaining access to the demised premises. On 10 August 1981 the respondent addressed a letter marked as Ex. P5 to the appellant in the following term, viz.

Re Closure of Century Hotel

We wish to advise you that the hotel will cease operation as at 30 August 1981. You are here given notice of termination of your Health Centre operation with effect from the above date.

May we thank you for your service rendered.

This prompted a reply from the appellant's solicitors on 11 August 1981 and the relevant part reads:

With effect from 7 August 1981 you have denied our client the use and quiet enjoyment of the demised premises and have by your conduct, evinced an intention not to perform your obligations under the lease and have thereby wrongfully repudiated the contract contained in the said lease. By your acts you have rendered it impossible for our client to carry on the business for which the premises were leased and have totally evicted our client from the demised premises. Consequently, our client hereby treats you as having put an end to the contract contained in the lease, reserving his right forthwith to sue for damages for breach of the essential terms of the lease. In any event, he will not be paying rent to you for future months.

On 11 November 1981 solicitors for the respondent sent a letter to the appellant's solicitors demanding the appellant to remove all his properties from the demised premises and if he should fail to do so by 16 November 1981, the respondent would take immediate step to have them taken away and charge him for the costs and expenses properly incurred thereby. Moreover, the keys to the demised premises had been returned and accepted by the respondent.

Apart from these documentary evidence the learned Judge found that prior to 7 August 1981 the respondent had already considered closing the hotel and a number of informal discussions was held with the tenants of the respondent. The appellant was represented by his partner PW4 at these meetings. It was then made known to the tenants that if the respondent should decide to cease operating the hotel it wanted all the tenants to vacate from their demised premises peaceably so that their businesses would not be affected too adversely. The learned Judge held that proposals for payment of compensation were discussed but no agreement appeared to have been reached, at least with the appellant.

Now, when the respondent sent Ex. P5 to the appellant requesting him to stop operating the recreation or health centre in the demised premises as from 30 August 1981, this was in breach of one of the covenants of the tenancy agreement. And if a distinct refusal by the respondent to perform one part of it goes to the root of the tenancy agreement, goes to the foundation of the whole, the appellant, in our opinion, was entitled to conclude that the respondent no longer intended to be bound by the terms of the tenancy agreement in the future. Whether or not this wilful breach amounted to a determination of the tenancy agreement is in our opinion a que