Ong J:

Mr Ramani, Counsel for the Collector of Land Revenue, i.e., the Government, as respondent, has raised a preliminary objection to my proceeding to hear this reference, on the ground that the Collector, in making his award had omitted to carry out his statutory duty and to make an apportionment of compensation in favour of a known interested party in accordance with para. (e) of s. 11(1) of the Land Acquisition Enactment. He submits that the effect of such omission is to invalidate that award, and that, in the absence of a valid award this Court has no jurisdiction to act on a reference.

Mr Rintoul, for the applicant, contends first, that, so far as the parties to this reference are concerned - and having regard to the provisions of s. 27 of the Enactment - the requisites for a valid award under s. 11 had been complied with; secondly, that the omission was only an irregularity that did not vitiate the award; thirdly, that the Collector cannot be heard to ask the Court to go behind his award when he relies on his own default; and fourthly, that the parties, by their respective legal advisers, had agreed to waive all irregularities and ask for a reference.

I do not propose to deal with all the arguments which have been addressed to me, norr discuss the various authorities which learned Counsel have cited. With all respect I think I can come to my decision in accordance with certain wellknown principles.

In the first place, I refer to the fundamental principle enuncited in Nusserwanjee Pestonjee v. Meer Mynoodeen Khan Wulled Meer Subroodeen Khan Bahadoor [1855] 6 Moo IA 134, 155 by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council:

Wherever jurisdiction is given to a Court by an Act of Parliament, or by a Regulation in India (which has the same effect as an Act of Parliament), and such jurisdiction is only given upon certain specified terms contained in the Regulation itself, it is a universal principle that these terms must be complied with, in order to create and raise the jurisdiction, for if they be not complied with the jurisdiction does not arise.

A reference to Court in the matter of land acquisition is governed by the Land Acquisition Enactment (Cap. 140), and its jurisdiction to entertain the reference is a jurisdiction resting solely on that statute. The conditions prescribed by s. 22 must be complied with before the Collector can make the reference and the Court have jurisdiction to act on it. As Chandavarkar J said in In re Land Acquisition Act, Government v. Nanu Kothare & Ors. ILR 30 Bom. 275, 285

These are the conditions prescribed by the Act for the right of the party to a reference by the Collector to come into existence. They are the conditions to which the power of the Collector to make the reference is subject. They are also the conditions which must be fulfilled before the Court can have jurisdiction to entertain the reference.

In the next place, a reference to Court postulates a valid award, that is to say, an award properly made in substantial conformity with the relevant provisions of the Enactment, which is s. 11.

Mr Ramani attacks the award on the ground that the Collector's failure to make an apportionment in favour of the option-holders of a 63-acre portion of the land acquired was a fatal defect. It may very well be so, or it may be that the omission was nothing more than an irregularity as Mr. Rintoul contends. I do not, however consider it necessary to decide this point because it is quite clear to me that on other grounds I do not have jurisdiction to proceed in the matter.

The Notification under s. 4(i) was signed on 19 July 1956 and appeared as notice No. 401 in the Selangor Government Gazette of 26 July 1956. The declaration under s. 6(i) was signed on 20 October 1956 and appeared in the Gazette as notice No. 577 on 25 October 1956. An award was made, under s. 11, by the Collector on 27 November 1956. The applicants did not accept this award and on 10 June 1957 made a written ap