1. Application to strike out defamation claim by political party's public officer against member of Parliament for alleged defamatory statement at Parliament corridor. (Para 2 , 5 , 6 , 8 )
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2022 MarsdenLR 1670
FEDERAL COURT PUTRAJAYA
LIM LIP ENG – Appellant
Versus
ONG KA CHUAN – Respondent
[Civil Appeal No: 02(i)-25-03-2020(W)]
A political party lacks the requisite reputation and cause of action to maintain a suit for defamation, emphasizing public interest in free speech and political discourse.
Headnote:(A) Civil Law Act 1956 – Section 8 – Societies Act 1966 – Section 9(c) – Defamation – Whether a political party can maintain a defamation suit – The Court held that a political party does not possess the requisite reputation for defamation claims as it lacks legal personality and does not have a cause of action. The relevant principle from Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd and its extension to political parties in Goldsmith v. Bhoyrul is reaffirmed by the Court, emphasizing public interest and the importance of political discourse. (Paras 90-116)
(B) Locus Standi – The Court found that while the respondent could sue as a registered society, it does not equate to a reputation warranting a defamation claim, affirming that protecting free speech is paramount in a democracy. (Paras 22-39)
(C) Ratio – The court affirmed that political parties must withstand public criticism and cannot claim defamation to avoid scrutiny, denying the appellant's claim based on the principles from earlier cases which stress the importance of public debate over potential reputational harm. (Paras 12-16)
Legal Category Hierarchy
- tort
- constitutional law
- practice and procedure
- statutory interpretation
Table of Contents
2. Appellant argued political parties lack locus standi for defamation citing Derbyshire principle and freedom of speech; respondent argued Chong Chieng Jen and statutory capacity under Societies Act support the suit. (Para 14 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 20 , 21 )
3. Appeal allowed; High Court and Court of Appeal decisions set aside; suit struck out; no costs ordered. (Para 90 , 117 )
4. Can a political party maintain a suit for defamation?
No. A political party does not have the requisite reputation to constitute a cause of action for defamation. The Derbyshire principle applies, and allowing political parties to sue would place an undesirable fetter on freedom of speech and democratic criticism. (Para 26 , 28 , 29 , 39 , 88 , 89 , 90 , 117 )
5. Does a society registered under the Societies Act have separate legal personality enabling it to sue for defamation?
No. A society does not have separate existence from its members and depends on them to sue. Unlike a company with legal personality, a society cannot sue or be sued in its own name and has no independent reputation. (Para 35 , 36 , 37 , 38 , 39 )
6. Does the Derbyshire principle apply to political parties in Malaysia?
Yes. The Derbyshire principle applies to political parties. It is contrary to public interest for a political party seeking office or governing to sue for defamation, as it would place an undesirable fetter on freedom of speech and democratic criticism. (Para 73 , 88 , 111 , 115 )
7. Does Chong Chieng Jen support a political party's right to sue for defamation?
No. Chong Chieng Jen dealt with a state government suing under the Government Proceedings Act, which provides statutory rights distinct from common law. It is distinguishable from the present case involving a society or political party without statutory equivalent. (Para 62 , 63 , 64 , 65 , 70 , 74 , 85 )
8. Is there a distinction between locus standi and cause of action in defamation?
Yes. Having the legal capacity to sue does not ipso facto mean there is a cause of action. A plaintiff must possess both standing and the requisite cause of action, which in defamation requires a reputation capable of being injured. (Para 16 , 29 , 33 , 70 )
JUDGMENT
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Introduction
[1] My learned sister Rohana Yusuf PCA, my learned brother Azahar Mohamed CJM, my learned sisters Hasnah Mohammed Hashim FCJ and Mary Lim Thiam Suan FCJ have read this judgment and they have expressed their agreement on the conclusion and the reasons set out in this judgment. My learned brother Harmindar Singh Dhaliwal FCJ and my learned sister Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ agreed with the conclusion of this judgment but for different reasons.
[2] The appellant had filed an application under O 18 r 19(1)(a) or (b), (c) and/ or (d) of the Rules of 2012, to strike out the respondent's claim in a Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim filed on 17 July 2017 (the said action) at the High Court of Kuala Lumpur for alleged tort of defamation, on the ground that the respondent, being a political party, had no locus standi to file a defamation suit.
[3] The application was dismissed by the High Court with costs on 27 February 2018 and on appeal, the decision of the High Court was affirmed by the Court of Appeal on 11 July 2019.
[4] On 12 March 2020, this Court had granted the appellant leave to appeal on the following sole question of law:
"Whether a political party can maintain a suit for defamation having regard to the decisions in Goldsmith & Another v. Bhoyrul & Others [1998] QB 459 and Rajagopal v. Jayalalitha [2006] 2 MLJ 689 ."
Brief Facts
[5] The appellant was a member of Parliament for Segambut Constituency. Currently, he is a member of Parliament for the Constituency of Kepong.
[6] The respondent is a public officer of a society registered as Malaysia Chinese Association (MCA) under the Societies Act 1966 (Act 335). MCA is a political society and a component party to the then ruling Federal Government of Malaysia.
[7]Subsection 9(c) of Act 335inter alia provides:
"a society may sue or be sued in the name of such one of its members as shall be declared to the Registrar and registered by him as the public officer of the society for that purpose ..."
[8] Hence, being the public officer of MCA, the respondent had filed an action against the appellant for an alleged defamatory statement issued by the appellant at a press conference held at the corridor of Parliament on or about 15 March 2017.
[9] The alleged defamatory words were:
"(i) Jadi saya minta parti MCA mengumumkan secara awam aset yang dimiliki oleh Parti MCA: FD, wang tunai, fixed asset, syer dan sebagainya. Secara umum, berapa aset yang dimiliki oleh MCA. Dan saya mengaitkan aset parti itu dengan peruntukan kerajaan kepada sekolah Cina. Saya nak juga MCA mengumumkan daripada jumlah aset yang dimiliki oleh MCA, berapa dari jumlah itu pernah diberikan kepada sekolah Cina... tiap-tiap tahun...
(ii) ... Informasi yang saya dapat, tidak pernah sekali pun MCA ambil dari poket parti sendiri untuk memberi kepada sekolah Cina I mean, dalam bentuk peruntukan. Semua yag dia dapat daripada donation awam, daripada kerajaan, dia masuk poket MCA sendiri. Masuk sahaja, tak pernah keluar."
[10] The appellant filed his defence at the High Court and thereafter, as alluded to before, filed the application in encl 6 to strike out the respondent's claim.
[11] The learned High Court Judge relied on the decision of this Court in Chong Chieng Jen v. Government Of State Of Sarawak & Anor, which rejected the principle in Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspaper Ltd & Ors [1993] 1 All ER 1011. In Derbyshire (supra), it was inter alia held that a local authority and a local government body could not sue for defamation. As such, the learned High Court Judge dismissed the appellant's application as His Lordship was of the view that the appellant had failed to show that the respondent's claim was obviously unsustainable.
[12] The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal against the decision of the High Court. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal. The grounds of judgment of the Court of Appeal are not available. However, according to its ex tempore grounds as reco
