Abdoolcader J (delivering oral judgment):

The Public Prosecutor appeals against the order made in this case in the Special Sessions Court at Ipoh on 7 July 1975 in respect of the respondent who pleaded guilty to two charges of unlawful possession of a Stirling .25 automatic pistol and six rounds of .32 ammunition respectively being offences punishable under s. 9(a) of the Arms Act, 1960 when the Special President by way of sentence applied the provisions of s. 294 of the Criminal Procedure Code and, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment, ordered that he be bound over in respect of each of the two charges for a period of two years in one surety in the sum of $2,000. The respondent's mother was directed to stand surety although the probation officer in his report, for some strange reason best known to himself, specifically advanced the suggestion that the respondent's mother should not be a surety and that the respondent should be released on his own recognizance and cautioned.

The charge against the respondent in respect of his unlawful possession of the automatic pistol was initially framed under s. 8 of the Firearms (Increased Penalties) Act, 1971 which of course carries a much more severe penalty. He claimed trial to that and the other charge in respect of the ammunition under s. 9(a) of the Arms Act, but on 2 June 1975, the prosecuting officer tendered an amended charge under s. 9(a) of the Arms Act in respect of the automatic pistol whereupon the accused pleaded guilty to both charges and the case was then adjourned to another date for sentence.

The facts adduced by the prosecution and admitted by the respondent are briefly that at about 9.30 p.m. on 2 December 1974, two police officers saw two persons standing on the five-foot way of the MCIS Building at Jalan Pasir Puteh, lpoh, and when they approached these two persons started running but one of the officers after a short chase caught the respondent and found on his person a .25 automatic pistol in a holster. The pistol had a magazine containing six rounds of ammunition. The respondent was arrested but the other person managed to escape. The respondent had no arms licence or permit to possess the pistol and ammunition which were subsequently sent to the armourer who found the pistol serviceable and the bullets live and capable of firing.

The respondent stated in mitigation through Counsel representing him before sentence was passed that he appreciated the seriousness of the charges but that he was misled by his friend who took advantage of his ignorance and simplicity and handed the pistol and ammunition to him and then ran away from the scene. I would have thought that his self-confessed simplicity lies more in the hollow and tenuous nature of the excuse he advanced which seems to me to be indeed unsurpassed in incredibility except perhaps by that of the pickpocket caught in flagrante delicto who sought to explain that he was looking for a box of matches, but when pressed as to why he could not ask for matches said that his mother had taught him never to speak to strangers. If indeed what the respondent said was true then obviously he should not and would not have admitted the facts adduced as he would not be in a position to know that the pistol which was found on him in a holster was in fact serviceable, knowledge of which would be in issue in view of the definition of 'arms' in s. 2 of the Arms Act, and I would have expected him to have claimed trial to the two charges.

In sentencing generally the public interest must necessarily be one of the prime considerations, and more particularly in offences involving the unlawful use or possession of firearms the public interest should never be relegated to the background and must of necessity assume the foremost importance. Of the several concepts relevant to sentencing, it is my considered view that deterrence and prevention assume positions in the forefront in relation to offences of this nature