Abdul Aziz Mohamad JCA:

[1] This appeal, which we unaminously dismissed, questioned the validity of a citation issued on 29 November 2000 under O. 72 r. 7 of the Rules of the High Court 1980. The state of affairs and the events that necessitated and led up to the issue of the citation are set out in the grounds of judgment of my learned brother, Zulkefli Makinudin JCA, with which my learned brother, James Foong JCA, associates himself.

The Need To Enter A Caveat

[2] Although the question about the need to enter a caveat was raised in the appellant's Skeletal Submission, it was raised merely as a point of appeal, that is, it was not argued, and in his oral submission in the appeal the appellant's counsel did not submit on the question, except to answer a question on the subject from my learned brother James Foong JCA at the close of the submissions. I therefore believed that the appellant was no longer pursuing the question and that it did not need to be decided. But since Zulkefli Makinudin JCA has dealt with the question, I will simply say that I, too, am of opinion, and for the reasons given by my learned brother, that there is no requirement in the Rules for the entry of a caveat as a precondition for the issue of a citation under O. 72 r. 7 and that the requirement of O. 71 r. 41(3) does not apply in respect of a citation issued under O. 72 r. 7.

[3] Only two questions were submitted on by the appellant's counsel in the appeal.

Grounds For Revocation Of The Appellant's Letters Of Administration

[4] The appellant's counsel submitted that the respondents had not disclosed valid grounds for the revocation of the grant to the appellant of the letters of administration that they intended to seek by their intended writ and that the grounds disclosed in the citation were not valid grounds. The appellant's counsel relied on the following passage at p. 472 of Tristram and Coote's Probate Practice, Nineteenth Edition:

An action for the revocation of letters of administration is instituted: (1) On the allegation that they were granted to a person without sufficient title to the grant. The object of such a suit is to compel the party who has obtained the grant of administration to establish such a degree of relationship with the deceased as will entitle him to the grant, and in the result it becomes an interest suit. (2) On the discovery of a will, the validity of which is not admitted by the grantee. This may necessitate an action for the revocation of the grant and for a pronouncement in favour of the will.

[5] The letters of administration granted to the appellant were for the estate of his father, YHK. In his petition dated 10 October 1995 for the grant of administration, the appellant listed two properties as comprising the estate of YHK, which for convenience I shall refer to simply as Lot 430 and Lot 432. The title to Lot 430 was subsequently cancelled on 4 August 1998 pursuant to an order of court dated 30 January 1996, having reverted to the State, and Lot 432 belonged to the estate of YSK, the father of YHK, who was the administrator of the estate of YSK and who died before completing the administration of that estate. Although Lot 432 was registered in the name of YHK, the registration was as a representative, that is, of the estate of YSK.

[6] In their affidavit in support of their application for the issue of the citation, the respondents, who are the children of YSK, gave, as reasons for the revocation of the grant of administration to the appellant that they would be seeking by writ, the petitioner's failure to state the true position as regards Lots 430 and 432 and the fact that YHK was a bankrupt.

[7] Although Lot 430 reverted to the State only after the appellant petitioned for the grant of administration, there was nevertheless a question to be answered whether the grant ought not now to be revoked seeing that the two properties that YHK's estate were said to comprise were not now the property of YHK's esta