1933 MarsdenLR 38
LORD ATKIN,LORD RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN,LORD MACMILLAN,MURISON,THORNE,TERRELL,SPROULE
(PRIVY COUNCIL) SINGAPORE
SHAIK SAHIED BIN ABDULLAH BAJERAI - Appellant
Versus
SST SOCKALINGAM CHETTIAR - Respondents
PRIVY COUNCIL APPEAL NO 57 OF 1932
Decided On : 02/03/1933
DN Pritt, KC and James Wylie, for the Appellant.
Sir Stafford Cripps, KC and HC Marks, for the Respondent.
This is an appeal from the Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements, where the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from the Acting Chief Justice, who gave judgment for the plaintiff. The action was brought by the plaintiff, a professional moneylender, against the defendant, a landowner, upon a promissory note payable on demand and a post-dated cheque given in respect of money-lending transactions.
The only defence material to this appeal is that there was no memorandum in writing of the contract signed by the borrower in pursuance of Section 6 of the English Moneylenders Act. The question is whether the provisions of Section 6 apply to this transaction in Singapore.
The suggestion is that the section is made applicable by Section 5 (17) of the Civil Law Ordinance No. 111 of 1920 of the Straits Settlements. That section provides:
"all questions or issues which arise or which have to be decided in the
Colony with respect to the law of partnerships, corporations, banks and
banking, principals and agents, carriers by land and sea, marine
insurance, average, life and fire insurance, and with respect to
mercantile law generally, the law to be administered shall be the same
as would be administered in England in the like case at the
corresponding period if such question in issue had arisen or had to be
decided in England unless in any case other provision is or shall be
made by statute."
The argument is that the question in this case is whether the defendant is liable on a negotiable instrument, that such question is one "with respect to" mercantile law, which includes the law of negotiable instruments, and that in applying English law to such a case in England the Courts would have had to apply the Moneylenders Act. The Courts in Singapore have rejected this contention, and their Lordships agree with this decision, but for reasons which do not altogether conform to those given in the Colony.
It is to be noted that the section does not purport to apply in every mercantile transaction. It applies only where a question or issue has to be determined with respect to mercantile law. The general object no doubt is to secure uniformity of mercantile law in Singapore and the United Kingdom, though of course, whatever the object, full effect must be given to the plain meaning of the words used. It is obvious that there are mercantile transactions in which no question with respect to mercantile law arises; just as there are non-mercantile transactions in which such a question does arise.
On a claim arising out of a sale of goods, the only question may be whether the plaintiff ever entered into an alleged written contract. If the sole question is whether his signature is a forgery, no question as to mercantile law seems to arise; if it is said he had given express or implied authority to someone "with respect to" the law of principal and agent or mercantile law generally may well arise.
Similarly, an allegation that an assent to a mercantile contract was obtained by duress, or by fraud, would normally not be a question with respect to mercantile law. So if a question of insurable interest arose on a claim on a fire policy, the law as to what constituted an insurable interest would be determined by the law of England; but the application of the principles in Singapore might depend upon the law of landlord and tenant, bills of sale, or the administration of deceased persons estates none of which in themselves form part of the mercantile law.
It might, on the other hand, depend upon questions relating to the law of contracts of sale or contracts of carriage by sea or land, which would bring into application the statute. Similarly, in an ordinary action of fraud, or in a criminal prosecution, in neither case arising out of mercantile transaction, questions of property might arise which could only be determined by recourse to mercantile law. Now it seems beyond