An appellate court must uphold a trial court's findings unless there is a clear misapprehension of facts or law, particularly regarding witness credibility and evidence in assessing damages.

[1] This appeal before us originated from a claim filed by the plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as the appellant) at the Sessions Court for injuries suffered as a result of a collision between her and the defendant (hereinafter referred to as the respondent). The Sessions Court found the respondent 100% liable for the accident and awarded general damages in the sum of RM155,000, special damages at RM64,675 and loss of future earnings at RM447,975. The respondent filed an appeal at the High Court but was only successful on the future earnings. In a nutshell the High Court disallowed the appeal regarding liability, general damages and special damages but allowed the appeal against future earnings. The appellant being dissatisfied filed a notice of appeal before the Court of Appeal and by choice restricted her appeal only on the issue of future earnings.

[2] It was obvious that the learned judge was fully aware of the principle that an appellate tribunal should be slow to interfere with the finding of fact of a trial judge, in this case the Sessions Court judge, more so as he had the advantage of hearing and observing the demeanour of the witnesses before arriving at his conclusion. This well established principle, which also has common sense written all over it, was clearly at the back of his mind as he had made mention of the case of Hussaina Rani Naina Mohamed v. Ahmad Nadzri Kamaruddin & Anor, 1997 MarsdenLR 1612 in his grounds of judgment (see also Yahaya Mohamad v. Chin Tuan Nam ; 1975 MarsdenLR 383 ; Tan Chow Soo v. Ratna Ammal; [1969] 2 MLJ 49).

[3] Despite the inhibition laid down by the above case, the learned judge still set aside the award of future earnings. Why he did that was merely an affirmation that the abovementioned inhibition is not absolute. It is the duty of an appeal Court, if satisfied or convinced that the trial judge had acted upon principles of law that were wrong, had misapprehended the facts or had made a wholly erroneous conclusion, to reverse the decision ( Tan Kuan Yau v. Suhindrimani Angasamy , 1985 MarsdenLR 649 ; [1985] CLJ (Rep) 323 ; Rasidin Partorjo v. Frederick Kiai ; [1976] 2 MLJ 214 ). Lindley MR in Coghlan v. Cumberland [1898] 1 Ch 704 had occasion to say:-

Even where, as in this case, the appeal turns on a question of fact, the Court of Appeal has to bear in mind that its duty is to rehear the case, and the Court must reconsider the materials before the judge with such other materials as it may have decided to admit. The Court must then make up its own mind, not disregarding the judgment appeal from, but carefully weighing and considering it; and not shirking from overruling it if on a full consideration the Court comes to the conclusion that the judgment is wrong.

[4] With the above legal statement foremost in our mind, and in order to decide whether the Sessions Court order ought to be reinstated or otherwise, it was incumbent upon us to peruse the grounds of judgment of the Sessions Court and that of the High Court. A logical step would be for us to also appreciate the respective submissions of the parties, and the evidence adduced in order to arrive at an independent finding. From those perusals we could gauge whether the future earnings award meted down by the Sessions Court had been considered in some detail by the learned judge ie, whether it was flawed, or should have just been dismissed outright. To his credit the learned judge here, prior to setting aside the future earnings award, had occasion to consider United Plywood And Sawmill Ltd v. Lock Ngan Loi,