Low Hop Bing J:

Application

This is an application by the first defendant in encl. (8) pursuant to O. 18 r. 19(1)(b) or (d) of the Rules of the High Court 1980for an order that the plaintiff's originating summons in encl. (1) filed on 14 March 2002 against, inter alia, the first defendant be struck out on the ground that the plaintiff's action against the first defendant is time-barred in that it was commenced 44 months after the detention order under s. 8(1) of the Internal Security Act 1960has been imposed on him on 7 July 1998 and that it was filed after the limitation period of 36 months prescribed in s. 2(a) of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948("s. 2(a)").

Submission For First Defendant

Mahamad Naser bin Disa, learned senior federal counsel, submitted for the first defendant that the prayers in the plaintiff's originating summons include, inter alia, two declaratory orders vizthat the detention order dated 7 July 1998 issued by the first defendant was not valid; and that the second defendant's decision on 11 September 2000 to dismiss the plaintiff was also not valid.

He added that pursuant to s. 2(a), the plaintiff should have commenced this suit or action against the first defendant within 36 months next after the act complained of ie, the detention order dated 7 July 1998 under the first limb of s. 2(a).

He also submitted that since the act complained of is the issue of the detention order on 7 July 1998, the period of 36 months would begin from that date and would expire on 7 July 2001, the detention order being a single act.

His submission is largely confined to the first limb of s. 2(a) and not the second limb thereof.

Contention For Plaintiff

J Amardas, learned counsel for the plaintiff, narrated that while the detention order was issued on 7 July 1998, the plaintiff was released on 3 January 2000 and that after the detention order, on 29 September 1998 the plaintiff received a letter of suspension from service without pay from 8 July 1998, and that the plaintiff received the decision of the second defendant that the plaintiff was dismissed from service with effect from 16 June 2000.

It was submitted for the plaintiff that there must be a complete cause of action before that cause of action could be filed and that time only began to run after a cause of action was complete ie, on 11 September 2000 when the plaintiff was informed of the said decision of dismissal, and not from the date of issue of the detention order on 7 July 1998.

He added that it was the detention order which resulted in the plaintiff's dismissal and that the plaintiff had to wait for the decision of the second defendant before he could institute this action, and that the detention order continued until he was released on 3 January 2000.

The thrust of his submission is primarily focused on the second limb of s. 2(a).

Decision Of The Court

1. Question For Determination

The question for determination by this court is whether the plaintiff in commencing this originating summons on 14 March 2002 against the first defendant to challenge the validity of the detention order issued by the first defendant against the plaintiff on 7 July 1998 is statute-barred, having regard to the limitation period of 36 months prescribed under either the first limb or the second limb of s. 2(a).

2. Ambit Of Section 2(a)

The entire application of the first defendant and the submissions by learned counsel for both the first defendant and the plaintiff gravitate solely towards the interpretation to be placed on the provisions of s. 2(a). The full impact of s. 2(a) may be put in proper perspective by reproducing in extensothe provisions thereof as follows:

Protection of persons acting in execution of statutory or other public duty

2. Where, after the coming into force of this Act, any suit, action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced in the Federation against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any written